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Tun manufacturing sector has been particularly active in the cyclical
movements of the United States economy, according to the historical
records of several decades. Factory employment and output have moved
in close rhythm with the business cycle. Comprehensive series representing
essentially these two variables were selected by Geoffrey H. Moore as
"roughly coincident" indicators of cyclical revivals and recessions.1
In this area, conformity to general economic fluctuations is, on the whole,
high even for series of narrower scope, representing employment, pro-
duction, or shipments of individual industries. The specific cycle turns
in the manufacturing series definitely tend to cluster about the dates
selected by the National Bureau as peaks and troughs in aggregate
economic activity.2
We shall not consider at any length now the reasons for this relatively
NOTE: I am deeply indebted to Geoffrey H. Moore for suggestions and criticisms
which helped in every stage of the work underlying this paper. In its early stage the
manuscript benefited, too, from the comments of Millard Hastay, Ruth P. Mack, and
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. A succession of assistants helped efficiently with the statistical
work: Nadeschda Bohsack, Moon-Young Cha, Leopold Koziebrodzki, and Dorothy
Suchman. I have also to thank Sophie Sakowitz and Johanna Stern for their assistance
in the detailed interpretation of the data.
These are: (1) nonagricultural employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics (and its
historical equivalent, the index of factory employment compiled by the BLS and, for
earlier years, by Harry Jerome for the National Bureau); (2) industrial production index,
Federal Reserve Board (in which the weight of manufacturing is about 90 per cent and
that of mining output 10 per cent). See Chapter 7, Table 7.11.
It will perhaps be said that this is not surprising, since these so-called reference dates
were themselves identified from time-series records, among which those for factory
production are quite numerous. But the statement, if not further qualified, would be a
gross oversimplification. Obviously no serious objection of circularity can be raised to
comparisons between specific cycle turns in any individual series or relatively small group
of series and the business cycle turns; the selected processes are but a fraction of those that
supplied the turning dates underlying the chronology of the nation-wide fluctuations.
Different processes vary greatly in their cyclical timing and in the regularity and sensitivity
of their cyclical reactions. The common reference chronology facilitates measurement and
appraisal of such differences among activities, and it performs this function for both the
individual series and the comprehensive aggregate. But it should be noted that, for any
type of economic process, a comprehensive series is likely to conform better to business
cycles than a series of narrow scope, since it will be less influenced by movements peculiar
to specific industries or localities, and more by the economy-wide tides of expansion and
contraction.
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close correspondence, but some points bearing on the explanation are
easily listed. Many companies experience large cyclical fluctuations in
demand and react to them strongly, primarily by output adjustments.
Industries in which there are many such companies constitute an important
part of manufacturing, which in turn is a sector that carries much weight
within the economy as a whole.
The above has a clear implication for the cyclical analysis of new
orders for industrial commodities. If peaks and troughs in aggregate
output of manufacturers on the average roughly coincide with like turns
in business cycles (without any significant leading or lagging), peaks and
troughs in the corresponding total of new orders should be expected
typically to lead these business cycle turns. This should be so, at least,
when both new orders and production are measured in the same units
(current or constant dollars or physical units). In production to order—
where manufacturing is undertaken in direct response to specific advance
commitments—new orders must of course lead output. There is evidence
to show that production to order accounts for a very large proportion of
total manufacturing. Moreover, even in production to stock—where
goods are made in anticipation of the demand for them and sold from
finished inventory—incoming business is likely to precede output.
The relations, expected and observed, among orders, production, and
shipments in manufacturing industries are examined at length in the
author's forthcoming monograph on the cyclical behavior of manu-
facturers' orders. A condensed account of this subject is given in the next
section of this paper in order to introduce the distinctions that proved
useful in studying these relations and tosee whether these same
categories can also be useful in interpreting observations at business cycle
turns.
Meanwhile let us resume the argument that new orders would be
expected to lead the business cycle because they lead the output of
products to which they give rise and stimulate ordering of other goods
needed for that production. This is a broad and simple notion which is
certainly not without merit as far as it goes. But it is also, in a sense, formal
and limited to the surface of the matter. Clearly, the timing of new orders
can never be explained by reference to the timing of production of the
order-receiving industries: the causal connection runs from commitments
or sales to output, not the other way round.
A thoroughgoing explanation of why the major categories of new
orders turn when they do is indeed one of the principal tasks of business
cycle theory. This will hardly be disputed in view of the undoubtedly
dynamic and critical role of the demands represented by the new order
series. But the task is very complex: commercial and industrial buying
depends on many economic processes just as it influences many. More-
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over, the available data on new orders are ill designed for use in such
analyses as are here required.3
Fortunately there is much to be learned from measures of cyclical
behavior of the data that we are able to gather and put in usable form;
and concern with explanations of a wider range should not delay the
presentation of these measures, but rather provide a stimulus to assimilate
them in a more comprehensive inquiry. Our plan calls for a discussion of
cyclical conformity and, in particular, of the timing of new orders at
major turns in aggregate economic activity (section III). One of the
questions to be dealt with is which industries saw their receipts of orders
turn early at general revivals and recessions, and which saw them turn
late. Any persistent traits in such sequences deserve careful attention.
They would bear upon the problem of interrelation of the demand flows,
and imply some systematic tendencies in sequences of production turns
for the same industries. Following the major section on timing of new
orders at business cycle turns is an account of the cyclical changes in
industry's backlog of unfilled commitments (section IV). Section V
contains a cyclical analysis of diffusion indexes based on new orders and
related data. In section VI we give a brief preliminary account of the
relation of new orders for investment goods to plant and equipment
expenditures, a matter of substantial interest to the analyst and fore-
caster of general business conditions. The last section (VII) summarizes
the findings of the study.
II. Relations Among Orders, Output, and Shipments
in Manufacturing Industries
SYSTEMATIC DIFFERENCES IN AMPLITUDE OF FLUCTUATION
Except at times when ordering is limited by sellers who temporarily
close their order books or by governmental action, data on new orders
represent a measure of current demand. The flow of demand is very
unstable for many types of manufactured product, due to a number of
factors, some of which are familiar from analyses of broad categories of
expenditures,in particular investment outlays.Cost and efficiency
considerations make it imperative for manufacturers to strive after greater
For example, to analyze what determines the fluctuations in buying of materials for
industrial production, data on new orders placed by manufacturers with their suppliers are
needed, but this information is largely unavailable. The situation is better but still far
from satisfactory in some other areas. Purchasing for trade depends considerably on sales
to consumers; here data on new orders placed by department stores and on sales of the
same firms are helpful, although better and additional statistics are still required. For an
analysis of what these data tell about the role of retailers' orders in transforming fluctua-
tions of consumer demand and transmitting them to earlier production sectors, see Ruth P.
Mack and Victor Zarnowitz, "Cause and Consequence of Retailers' Buying," The
American Economic Review, March 1958, pp. 18—49.
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stability of their outputs relative to fluctuating demand. Factors inde-
pendent of any deliberate actions of the producers also supplement at
times their stabilization policies. The joint effect of both sets of influences
is that a considerable measure of stabilization is achieved in various
industries most of the time. The relative amplitudes of both cyclical
fluctuations and shorter movements are systematically larger for new
orders than for the corresponding series on current manufacturing
operations.4
In discussing these regularities an important distinction must be
drawn between production to order and production to stock. When
finished inventories change in an "inverted" fashion, i.e. increase during
contractions and decrease during expansions in demand, it is always an
indication that some output stabilization has been achieved, although it
is not always a result of planning for stabilization.5 But this, of course,
presupposes the existence of substantial unsold stocks, that is production
"for the market" rather than to specific orders. Other ways to stabilize
production must be sought by manufacturers of goods made exclusively
or predominantly to order (products made to individual specification, or
unstorable,or subjecttosporadic,style-sensitive,or unpredictable
demand). These manufacturers cannot or will not accumulate finished
goods inventories, but they may at times be in a position to accumulate a
backlog of orders. If they- carry it over, as surplus of work to be done,
from a period of expanding into a period of contracting business, they
will then be able to draw upon it and thereby maintain for some time
satisfactory levels of activity.
In times of demand pressures when the position of suppliers is strong
("seller's markets"), many manufacturers will obtain advance orders in
sufficient volume and have a sufficient degree of discretion over the
delivery dates o be able to initiate a stabilization policy of this type.
Indeed, at such times order backlogs may well accumulate even without
any planned action by producers to achieve this result; some accumulation
will occur as long as demand is not deterred (by substantial price increases)
from rising above the levels of full capacity production.6
The evidence on this and other points made in this section is given in the author's
monograph referred to above.
Accumulation of unsold stock may, of course, be due to incorrect sales forecasts
rather than to an intention to work for surplus inventory to keep current activity from
falling off too drastically when sales decline.
During a single month, a firm cannot fillfromcurrent output more orders than its
capacity permits, but it can receive orders far in excess of that amount. The capacity
constraint, then, works in the same direction as a deliberate policy of using order backlogs
for output stabilization. To note a formal analogy: the nonvolitional factor in the accumu-
lation of unfilled orders during a boom expresses the inability of output to follow the
course of sales, while the nonvolitional factor in the accumulation of unsold stock during
a slump reflects the inability of output to anticipate the course of sales.
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Ultimately, the effectiveness of such a policy or process depends also
upon the firmness of the received orders. But there is ample evidence
that changes in unfilled orders are an important instrument in stabilizing
output in certain major industries. Thus we find that unfilled orders have
a general positive conformity to business cycles and to major fluctuations
in the output of the corresponding industries. Moreover, the predominant
tendency of production to move cyclically in the same direction as new
orders (with a lag) becomes temporarily inoperative in certain periods
following accumulations of considerable backlogs. A major (but not very
long) contraction in new orders would then be accompanied by stable
or even moderately increasing output and shipments.
PRODUCTION TO ORDER AND PRODUCTION TO STOCK
The distinction between goods made typically to order and goods made
typically to stock is particularly important in the analysis and inter-
pretation of timing relations among new orders, production, and ship-
ments. In the case of a pre-ordered commodity, the time sequence is, of
course, invariably new orders-output-shipments. The lag of output
behind orders may well be long, due to a long production period, or a long
delay before new orders are started in production, or both.7 The lag of
shipments behind output is likely to be short. In manufacture to stock,
on the other hand, output need not necessarily follow upon new orders,
which are here coincident with shipments. It could well lead them, and
in fact occasionally does, although the prevailing tendency seems to be for
output of various finished staples to lag behind orders or shipments by short
intervals, presumably because of the difficulties and hazards that are
usually associated with making sales forecasts and acting upon them.8
In practice, a manufacturing concern produces as a rule not one but
several or many products, of which some may be made to order and others
to stock. In some lines of business, both types of production policy may be
pursued by different firms, or by the same firms at differ'it times. If
only for these reasons, empirical estimates of the order-output-shipments
lags for various industries or products must not be expected to show such
sharp and systematic differences as the contrast between the two simple
models—pure production to order and pure production to stock—might
The lag must be at least as long as the technically necessary production period; on
new models and applications it will often be considerably lengthened by the time needed
for planning, designing, procuring skills and materials, testing, etc. It will be longer than
the production period in the broadest sense of this term if there is a backlog of unfilled
commitments, the work on which is being scheduled and carried out according to the
priority ratings of the various orders.
Cf. Moses Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1950, pp.
256—262. The reference in the text is to finished nonperishable staples made from storable
materials—the class of goods best qualified to be produced "for the market," i.e. not
for specific orders.
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suggest.9 What can b expected is that they will reflect these differences
in a more or less muted form, roughly in accordance with the degree to
which one or the other type of production prevails in the industries
analyzed. But how strong is that prevalence, especially in the more
broadly defined industries? In a classification of industries according to the
relative importance of production to order, would the timing relations
among orders, shipments, and output differ significantly as envisaged?
To establish the distinctions needed to answer these questions requires
an examination of a variety of data, but our main method is to compare
for each industry or product for which information was available the
levels of finished goods inventory (F) and of unfilled orders (U). Where
F is typically higher than U, production to stock is said to prevail; where
F is typically lower, production to order. The rationale of this is that
when all output is made to stock, F (consisting of product not yet sold) is
always positive, while U is nil. In pure production to order, on the other
hand, F is probably small absolutely and certainly small relative to U
(unsold stocks are nil and sold stock would accumulate in larger volumes
only if deliveries lagged behind output by long intervals, which is unlikely).
The industries for which we have data on both variables must, of course,
be situated somewhere between these two extremes. The greater the
importance of goods made to order in its total output, the closer will an
industry approach the first limiting case and the lower will be its repre-
sentative F/U ratio. Conversely, the larger the share of production to stock,
the higher will be the ratio.10
Still other complications arise in measuring timing relations. It is often difficult to
identify and match the turning points in activities that are subject to seasonal and
irregular variations as well as cyclical and longer-term movements. Among individual
comparisons of this type, some may very well be of problematic significance, reflecting
mainly erratic or episodic influences. Thus occasionally disagreement with the expected
patterns of timing may be due to technical errors of observation or measurement. However,
lapses will most likely be rectified, and sensible and essentially correct results obtained,
when the comparisons at individual turns are averaged to estimate the timing relation
typical of the given industry and period (assuming, of course, that the method is applied
to a significant sample of proper data).
'°Theratios were computed from monthly averages of F and U for each complete
calendar year covered by the data, and expressed as percentages. As would be expected,
these annual series of the average stock-backlog ratios move inversely to cycles in the
given industry's activity and indeed usually to the business cycle at large. To take account
of the cyclical factor, separate averages were computed of the ratios for the expansion
(including peak) years and for the contraction (including trough) years, using the National
Bureau's annual reference chronology. The averages—we used medians to avoid distortion
by the extreme items which are here as a rule very unrepresentative—are in all but a few
cases higher for the contraction than for the expansion years. But we find that the ratio
series, while all fluctuating cyclically, group themselves easily into two major categories:
those which in most years, expansion and contraction alike, move substantially below the
level of 100 (i.e. F < U) and those which move in a parallel fashion above that level
(F> U). We infer that the former represent mainly goods made typically to order and
the latter goods made typically to stock.
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On the whole, the evidence of the stock-backlog ratios conforms to
what would be expected. For example, the ratios are low in both good and
bad business years for steel sheets, which are known to be made largely
to specification, and extremely low throughout for steel barrels and drums,
a heavy item of industrial equipment. The ratios run below the level of
100 for those textile products which are style-sensitive or must meet
individual buyer requirements, e.g. men's wear wool fabrics and yarns,
cotton and worsted. They are, on the other hand, higher than 100 for
various finished staples: textile products such as hosiery or sheets, con-
struction materials such as southern pine lumber or face brick, residential
building equipment such as oil burners or bathroom fixtures. In section
IV those individual industries and products for which we have measured
the timing of new orders at business cycle turns are classified according to
whether they represent manufacture to order or manufacture to stock
(see Tables 14.2 and 14.3).
The output of a major industry can be very heterogeneous in its
composition by goods made to order and goods made to stock (a telling
example is provided by textile products). This does not impair the signifi-
cance of the stock-backlog ratios for such industry groups as primary
metals, machinery, and transportation equipment, where they indicate
very much what would be expected, namely a heavy preponderance of
production to order. According to the ratios of still more comprehensive
aggregates, industries which sell mainly from future output are decidedly
dominant in the composite of all durable manufactures. In contrast,
production to stock apparently prevails within the aggregate of nondur-
able goods industries. For manufacturing as a whole, the evidence
suggests that sectors working to order outweigh those working for stock,
and this despite the inclusion here of seven major nondurable goods
industries whose backlogs of unfilled orders (not reported) are assumed
negligible and treated as zero.1'
TIMING RELATIONS
We were able to match series on new orders and shipments for two
groups of individual industries and products: eleven items representing
manufacture to order (I) and seven items representing manufacture to
The period covered by the major industry data, beginning in 1939, includes mostly
years of good or excellent business conditions. However, even in 1939, which was still quite
a poor year, finished stocks amounted to no more than 88 per cent of unfilled orders for all
manufactures (48 and 229 per cent for total durables and total nondurables, respectively).
In the weakest of the postwar years, 1949, the corresponding ratios were 52, 25, and
279; and at the peak in the total order backlogs, 1952, they fell to 20, 10, and 256 per
cent. The over-all median ratio for the entire period is 23 per cent, which on the logic of
the test is a strong indication that the greater part of manufacturing production is organ-
ized on the order basis.
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stock (II) 12 A close inspection of these series and a count of turns covered
and matched show that order and shipment series have largely parallel
cyclical movements. In a few cases new orders have a somewhat larger
number of specific cycle turns than shipments, that is some additional
cyclical movements. But practically all of the peaks and troughs in ship-
ments are matched by like turns of new orders, in either group of data.
The timing patterns differ distinctly between the two groups, however.
The leads of new orders over shipments tend to be both shorter and less
regular for the sample of goods made to stock than for the sample of goods
made to order. When items in each sample are ranked by the average
lead of orders, we find that the shortest mean lead in group I (1.6 months)
differs little from the longest comparable lead in group II (1.9 months).
In other words, there is little overlap between the two arrays; rather the
one for the order-made commodities stops descending toward ever
shorter leads approximately where the other begins. The timing averages
for the items representing manufacture to stock are all contained within
the range of "rough coincidences" (leads or lags not longer than three
months and instances of synchronous timing), although a tendency toward
short leads of orders is distinguishable. The comparable measures for the
items representing manufacture to order vary over a long range, but
eight out of the eleven are leads of from four to eleven months. Distri-
butions of the individual timing comparisons within each set provide
further demonstration of the contrast between the two groups. In short,
the facts support the expectation that new orders anticipate shipments by
longer intervals and more regularly for goods sold largely in advance of
production than for goods sold largely from finished stocks.
Another block of evidence showing the tendency of new orders to
lead shipments is provided by aggregate value series for major industries
(the current estimates of the Office of Business Economics are the principal
data here). These industries cannot be divided between goods made to
order and goods made to stock, but can be grouped according to the
durability of their products. As mentioned before, the stock-backlog
ratios indicate that manufacture to order prevails heavily among the
durables and manufacture to stock among nondurables. The evidence of
the timing measures accords with the expected relations: the leads of new
orders over sales, i.e. the value of shipments, are on the whole longer
for the durable goods than for the nondurable goods sector of manu-
facturing.13'Forthe composition of the two groups, see Table 14.3. It will be noted that group I
consists mainly of highly complex or specialized or large-unit and expensive goods used
by producers: iron and steel products, industrial machinery and transportation equip-
ment. In contrast, the products in group II are much more standardized and closer to the
needs of consumers, associated most of all with residential construction. "Theaverage lead of orders at six turning points in durables sales during 1949—58
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According to the a priori argument, the timing relative to new orders
of output need not show a systematic difference between production to
order and production to stock, such as is largely predictable for the
comparisons of incoming business with shipments. Factual evidence is
much needed here; data on new orders and output (all in physical terms)
can be matched only for a few individual industries.'4 Timing comparisons
for this regrettably small sample show a tendency for the turns in new
orders to anticipate the turns in production, but most of these leads are
short, averaging about three months or less. There is no evidence here
that the over-all timing patterns differ significantly for the two groups.
This is consistent with the notion that new orders guide and hence
anticipate production even in those industries in which they are custom-
arily shipped from stock shortly upon receipt. However, it should be
noted that these timing records, besides being scanty, refer to products
which, in terms of the order-shipment comparisons, are not very sharply
differentiated.'5 It is not unlikely that order-output comparisons for a
more representative sample would show more of a contrast between the
two types of manufacture (as the comparisons with shipments for such
data certainly would).
PRODUCTION PERIOD, CAPACITY UTILIZATION, AND ORDER-BACKLOG POSITION
Technological factors arc as a rule significant in determining the rela-
tion between new orders and manufacturing production. Interindustry
differences in the average length of the order-output leads apparently
reflect the variation in production periods. Thus railway equipment, heavy
and specialized machinery, and structural steel, which includes some of
the most elaborate steel products, all have long order leads, averaging
six months and more. Industries or groups of commodities that are
presumably less heavily weighted with complex or specialized types of
product—pig iron, steel sheets, paper products, furniture, and wood-
working machinery—have shorter average leads, of four months and less.
was 4.8 months. For total nondurables, the mean of the four timing comparisons that can
be made over the same period is —0.2 months, suggesting a closely synchronous relation.
But most of this difference is because, for the most part, orders received by nondurable
goods manufacturers are assumed to equal sales (in the absence of reported order backlogs).
For the rest of the nondurables division—four major industries reporting unfilled orders—
the average lead of the value of incoming business at the eight turns in the value of
shipments, 1948—58, was respectably long (4.1 months).
14Wehave used series for merchant pig iron, steel sheets, paper (excluding building
paper and newsprint) and paperboard to represent manufacture to order, and oak
flooring and southern pine lumber to represent manufacture to stock. Comparisons were
made at production turns falling in the years 19 17—56. jThatis, merchant pig iron, steel sheets, and paper are among those order-made
items that have relatively short shipment lags, while oak flooring and southern pine
lumber rank high in length of lags among the components of the "made-to-stock" group.
The averages in Table 14.4, col. 2, summarize the evidence.
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So much for the evidence of individual products representing goods made
typically to order. Measures for major industries based on aggregate
value data show similar differences which, however, may reflect the
variation in the typical production period somewhat less and the vari-
ation in the proportion of output manufactured to order somewhat more.
Thus the longest average lead of new orders relative to sales is that for the
transportation equipment industry, which produces items of great size
and complexity such as ships, airplanes, and locomotives. Fabricated
metal products and machinery rank second and third with leads of
similar intermediate length, and primary metals fourth. "Other durable
goods" have short leads and coincidences.'6
Of a different sort is the variation between the order leads observed
at successive turns in the productive activity of any given industry. Some
of these differences have systematic features. They can hardly be attrib-
utable to changes in the production period in the narrow sense of the
term (time required for fabrication) since this is presumably fairly stable
over time. Instead they are apparently related to changes in the capacity
and backlog position of the firms that fill the orders.
On the whole, firms utilize a higher proportion of their capacities
near the peaks than near the troughs in the activity of a given industry.'7
At some point in the advanced stages of a vigorous output expansion,
many companies are likely to experience a strain on their productive
facilities. The actual or anticipated costs of an additional order that is to
be filled with the usual promptness will then rise, so that many firms will
be unable or unwilling to assume new commitments unless they can extend
the delivery periods. It is true that by raising the prices of their products
sufficiently high the firms may conceivably succeed in keeping the orders
they currently receive down to the levels that they can handle without
more than the usual lags. But such pricing is likely to be regarded by some
manufacturers as too risky in view of the degree and character of com-
petition in the markets in which they operate. Also, in the minds of
many, the longer-lasting advantages of accumulating larger order back-
logs outweighs the more transient, and ultimately far less certain, gains
to be obtained from higher pricing. Hence, few are likely to jeopardize,
This category is composed largely of furniture, lumber, and stone, clay, and glass
products. Furniture is made to order but apparently at rather short notice. Lumber
products are mostly staples produced for the market which typically have short delivery
periods. Clay and glass products, too, are made largely to stock. Here, as elsewhere,
timing differences revealed by comparisons of aggregate data have analogies in some of
the measures for individual industries and products and are consistent with the indications
of the stock-backlog ratios.
17Therelative movements of physical output and of output as a percentage of capacity
will correspond very closely for industries which are subject to large fluctuations of
demand and which require specialized and expensive large-unit equipment of consider-
able short-run rigidity. In our data such industries are well represented (e.g. metal
products, machinery).
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by immoderate pricing, an opportunity to secure in good times a broad
and reasonably firm order basis for future work.18
The argument has several implications which can be tested by statistical
facts. For one, leads of new orders would be expected, on the whole, to
be shorter at troughs than at peaks in activity. On most occasions, our
timing comparisons do confirm this expectation. Some exceptions are
important, however. During a boom, advance commitments are accepted
by many companies which at other times do not maintain order backlogs,
so that production to order usually gains relative to production to stock.
When demand eases off, orders can again be filled more promptly.
But in the advanced stages of a contraction which has lasted long enough
to permit manufacturers to reduce their inventories, delivery lags on some
items normally shipped from stock may ultimately lengthen too.
Again, a substantial amount of directional agreement (positive con-
formity) should obtain between the major movements in unfilled orders
reported by an industry and its current activity, as represented by output
or shipments. Indeed all but very few cyclical turns in order backlogs
can be matched with like turns in activity. True, the proportion of
unmatched turns in activity (when the specific cycle chronologies in
unfilled orders are used as a reference frame) is not quite as low. But this
still fits well into the picture. Weak or short expansions in activity, which
fail to reach up into the range of full-capacity utilization, need not be
paralleled by expansions in unfilled orders. Sometimes a mild cyclical
movement in activity will correspond to a mere retardation in the course
of the order backlogs. The latter, it will be noted, represent a "stock"
magnitude whose movements are typically much smoother than those of
such "flow" variables as output or shipments.
Of course, even when unfilled orders do increase, this in itself does
not necessarily indicate a tendency for the average delivery periods to
lengthen. It is the increase in backlogs relative to current shipments that
indicates such tendency. The ratio of unfilled orders to shipments (U/S)
represents the number of months that would be needed to dispose of
the existing backlogs at the present rate of operations, or roughly the
average time interval elapsing between an order's receipt and delivery.
Hence if order backlogs expand but shipments do too, at about the same
rate, the presumption is that the average delivery period remains stable.
Actually, however, the ratio U/S is far from stable, but shows cyclical
movements which most of the time correspond in direction to those in
18Ofcourse, a strong expansion of demand to levels exceeding the capacities of the
suppliers will typically cause both price increases and lengthening of the average delivery
periods (backlog accumulation). But it is important to realize that the second effect tends
to dampen the first one: if a larger part of the increase in demand is absorbed by additions
to order backlogs, less of it will go into price rises (cf. R. F. Harrod, "The British Boom,
1954—55," The Economic Journal, March 1956, esp. pp. 1—5).
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CHART14.1
Manufacturers' New and Unfilled Orders, Sales, and Ratio
of Unfilled Orders to Sales, Durable Goods Industries, 1948—58
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
When new orders exceed sales, the areas between the two curves are shaded.
Asterisks identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in manufacturers' new and
unfilled orders; dots, in manufacturers' sales.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.
totalunfilled orders (see Chart 14.1 for an illustration for the aggregate
of the durable goods industries). During a buying boom when output
falls heavily behind new orders, backlogs are likely to increase not only
absolutely but also in relation to shipments; during a buying slump the
reverse development is typical.
If only because of their great sensitivity to irregular and episodic
influences, individual timing comparisons between new orders and output
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such different measures as rates of capacity utilization and backlog-
shipment ratios. It is certainly significant that positive coefficients are ob-
tained throughout when order leads are correlated with either measure.19
The more important factors among those that are likely to complicate
the picture may now be briefly considered. 1. In slack times producers
may wish to keep their crews and plants busy at a slower pace but over
longer periods, thus counteracting the tendency for the delivery lags to
become shorter. 2. When demand is high and rising, many buyers, them-
selves under pressure, seek early delivery dates, but once a slump has set
in their interest in prompt supplying is likely to abate. 3. As long as there
are substantial reserve capacities in an industry enjoying an expansion in
demand, the firms that have such reserves will attract much of the new
business owing to their ability and willingness to fill orders quickly.
Firms working near or at capacity are then deterred from making long
delays in delivery by the risk that this will impair their good will or even
that some of their orders will actually be canceled and lost to com-
petitors. Unless all the companies are equally busy or are working with
the same lags, there is always some ground for such apprehensions.
Consequently, for the given industry as a whole, there is probably less
retardation in filling orders when the amounts of orders received by indi-
vidual companies differ substantially in the advanced stages of expansion
than when such is not the case. 4. Lastly, the intensity of the fluctuations
in demand is particularly important. Some expansions merely raise outputs
from low to more satisfactory but still not very high levels; here the produc-
tion volumes of many establishments will have been falling short of their
capacities all along, including the output peaks. On the other hand, a vig-
orous and widespread expansion in new orders for goods with long produc-
tion periods may leave the industry with heavy backlogs of work waiting to
be started or completed. If the ensuing contraction in new orders is short, 'Apositive coefficient signifies that long leads are associated with high utilization or
backlog-shipment ratios. The accompanying figures summarize a few relations of this type:
Coefficient of Rank Correlation9 Between
the Indicated Timing Measures and
Ratio of Unfilled
Timing Measures Orders to Shipments
Industry and Period
(no. in brackets)
New Orders Relative to
Prod. as Per Cent or Production
of Capacityt' (identified in cot. 2)t'
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Steel sheets, 1919—32 Shipments (9) +0.63 +0.50
Furniture, 1923—45 Shipments (8) +0.33
Paperboard, 1926—56 Production (17) +0.52 ±0.31
Spearman's coefficient adjusted for the presence of "ties" or duplicated rank
standings.
t'Three-monthaverages centered on month of turn in shipments or production.
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it may not bring about any decline in activity at all, but merely reduce
the rates of increase in backlogs and in output. A new expansion in
demand will then put an end to these retardations and induce an acceler-
ated increase in production and deliveries.
Interesting examples of divergent cyclical movements in new orders, on
the one hand, and unfilled orders and production and shipments, on the
other, are found in the history of several major industries in recent years.
Thus Chart 14.1 shows that sales of durable goods failed to turn down in
1951 despite the sharp contraction in new orders during the first three
quarters of the year. Then in 1952—53 sales moved up again at high rates
after a prolonged lull, even though the recovery in ordering which had
begun several months earlier was only moderate and quite hesitant
throughout. We submit that the behavior of sales in both periods (which
was very similar to that of durables' output) must be attributed largely
to the backlog factor. In 1951 unfilled orders were already high and rising,
in 1952—53 partly rising and partly declining but very high throughout.
The mild business contraction in 1953—54 was dominated by the
business objective of getting inventories under better control, i.e. into
better balance with current sales and incoming orders. Most manu-
facturers apparently did not regard their backlogs as high enough to
justify stepping up activity in prompt response to the upturn in new orders
which came in the first third of the contraction. As long as new orders
were still much lower in value than output or shipments, their steady but
slow recovery could be met by retardation, rather than by a reversal, of
the contraction processes, such as that of inventory liquidation. Thus
output and shipments continued to decline through most of the year
1954, and turned up only after incoming orders finally caught up with
sales (orders shipped) and backlogs stopped declining.
III. Timing at Business Revivals and Recessions
INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES OR PRODUCTS2°
Table 14.1 shows a strong tendency of new orders for a variety of
products to turn down before the peaks and to turn up before the troughs
in aggregate economic activity. For each of the thirty items, new orders
show an average lead at business cycle turns (col. 5). These mean leads
50Theseries used in this section are with few exceptions trade association statistics.
Five series on orders for various types of machinery and supplies and one for furniture are
in current dollars (see lines 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, and 27 in Table 14.1). All others are in
physical units. Only four of the thirty series are nondurables—paper and textile products.
As might be expected, there is much more information on new orders (as distinguished
from shipments) for industries which do business largely against advance contracts than
for industries which customarily sell most of their products from stock. Hence the data give
better representation to the largely order-made producer goods, most of which are
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































differ greatly in length, descending from nine months at the top of the
table to slightly less than one month at the bottom, but they exceed three
months for two-thirds of the list. Timing varies considerably in the suc-
cessive revivals and recessions, too, as witness the average deviations in
column 6. But leads of orders prevail heavily throughout, and long and
intermediate leads are more frequent than others for most of the industries
and products included.
Timing regularities should be appraised against the background of
conformity measures. A consistent leader is a series that leads at a large
proportion of the reference turns covered, i.e. of the dates of the general
business reversals within the period encompassed by the data. A series
would not deserve a high consistency rating even if it led at each turn
matched, if it matched but a few of the revivals and recessions through which
it passed. Reading columns 3 and 4 in Table 14.1 line byline makes it clear
that new order series match, that is turn in sympathy with, the large
majority of peaks and troughs in the business cycles they cover. In fact,
the percentage matched is equal to or higher than 80 for twenty-two of the
thirty series included in the table, and higher than 60 for all but two.
If observations for all series are combined, the percentage matched is as
high as 86 (363 out of 420).
Most of the timing observations included in Table 14.1 refer to the
business cycle turns of the interwar years, 1919—38; the period after World
War II is less well represented. Table 14.2 presents the distribution of the
leads and lags of new orders at each of the eight revivals and seven
recessions during 19 19—38 and 1948—54 (most of the series included
failed to match the short business contraction in 1945). It shows that
upturns in newly received business preceded each of the major troughs
in aggregate economic activity by average intervals of about three to six
months. Downturns in the incoming orders anticipated the business
peaks by more variable intervals; their timing was characterized by very
long leads on some occasions (1926, 1948) and by short leads and rough
coincidences on others (1920). All in all, these measures suggest that
a prior turn in most categories of new orders is a highly regular charac-
teristic of a business revival or recession.
Table 14.3 presents a summary of the timing at business peaks and
troughs of two groups of new order series representing production to
order and production to stock. The timing of new orders in either category
is shown to be on the average somewhat earlier at peaks than at troughs.
The measures offer no evidence of a systematic difference in cyclical
timing between the two groups of series. This contrasts with the finding
that leads of new orders relative to shipments are (as would be expected)
longer for order-made than for stock-made products. According to the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Timing of Thirty Series on New Orders at Business Cycle Turns, Distrib
Leads and Lags by Type of Turn and Type of Manufacture
ution of
Number of Timing Observations
Av. Lead
(—)or Type of Manufacture Exact Rough
Represented (number of Coinci- Coinci- Lag (+)b
series in brackets) LeadsdencesLagsdencesa Total(months)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. AT REFERENCE PEAKS
1.Manufacture to order (19)' 107 5 22 49 134 —5.6
2.Manufacture to stock (11) 38 0 4 12 42 —6.6
3.Total (30) 145 5 26 61 176 —5.8
B. AT REFERENCE TROUGHS
4.Manufacture to order (19)' 113 9 15 65 137 —4.2
5.Manufacture to stock (I l)° 44 0 6 14 50 —4.9
6.Total (30) 157 9 21 79 187 —4.4
C. AT ALL REFERENCE TURNS
7.Manufacture to order (19)C 220 14 37 114 271 —4.9
8.Manufacture to stock (1 1)5 82 0 10 26 92 —5.7
9.Total (30) 302 14 47 140 363 —5.1
a Includesexact coincidences and leads or lags of one, two, or three months.
"Weighted by the numbers of observations for each component item.
CThisgroup includes all series in Table 14.1 other than those listed below in note d.
d This group includes the following series (numbers in brackets refer to lines in Table
14.1): Southern pine lumber (1), oak flooring (2), clay and glass products (4), bath
tubs (6), lumber (14), architectural terra cotta (16), textile products (20), lavatories (25),
kitchen sinks (26), oil burners (29), misc. enameled sanitary ware (30).
anything, somewhat earlier than the other series at business revivals and
recessions. Hence the measures imply that some industries that customarily
fill their orders on receipt or on short notice experience cyclical turns
in their activity relatively far ahead of peaks and troughs in general
business; their new orders and shipments are both early leaders.
Direct evidence on this is given in Table 14.4, which shows the average
timing of new orders as well as shipments for those industries in our sample
for which corresponding series on the two variables are available. The
list includes seven items representing manufacture to stock. In this group
turns of new orders preceded business reversals by greatly varying but
predominantly long intervals, as indicated by the measures in column 4.
Since these goods have short order periods (column 2), theirshipments, too,
turned substantially ahead of business revivals and recessions (column 3).
The made-to-order capital goods that head the list of industries in
Table 14.4 according to their long order-shipment intervals present a
different picture. On the average, turns in new orders for these products
anticipated the reversals in aggregate economic activity by from two to
six months. The delivery periods were apparently by and large longer,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and troughs in general business and for the rest they led such turns by
short intervals.
Obviously, at least as far as comparatively small segments of total
manufacturing are concerned, long leads of new orders relativeto
production or shipments in a given industry need not necessarily be
associated with long leads of new orders at business cycle turns. The
shipment turns for all types of goods are, as one would expect, widely
scattered on both sides of the turning points in business at large. Peaks
in new orders have a strong tendency to occur before the end of expansions,
and troughs before the end of contractions, in economic activity; but the
dispersion of the cyclical reversals in ordering is also considerable, though
it may be less than that of the turns in current manufacturing operations.
The variety of timing patterns in buying from industry poses interesting
problems. The earliness of new orders for certain standardized materials
and finished staples may be due to the cyclical responsiveness of prices
and the price sensitivity of buying in these areas. The timing of orders
for capital goods that require considerable time to be started in production,
completed, and delivered is likely to depend less on prices and short-term
market prospects and more on business expectations covering relatively
long spans of time. The information that we were able to examine is not
inconsistent with these notions but convincing evidence about them can
only be yielded by a careful study, larger in scope than the present one.
MAJOR INDUSTRY AGGREGATES
The lack of a comprehensive historical series on manufacturers'
new orders is a serious gap in the stock of available statistical records,
which unfortunately we cannot close in any really satisfactory manner.
In the current Department of Commerce compilation on the value of new
orders placed with manufacturers, broad aggregates for all durable goods
industries and a group of nondurable goods industries reporting order
backlogs begin in 1939. For earlier years, there is the monthly index of the
value of manufacturers' new orders, 1935—39100, computed by the
National Industrial Conference Board. This begins in 1929 and extends
through July 1944. From January 1934 on, it covers six nondurable goods
industries and ten durable goods industries; an index for the latter group
has also been published.2'
21Thetotal index comprises 17 series, as it includes a "miscellaneous" category not
covered in either the durable or nondurable goods indexes. The weight for each industry
was based on the total value of its product as reported in the Census of Manufactures of
1937. The seasonal adjustment of the chain indexes computed for each industrial group
was made by the NICB. For a more detailed description of this index, see the Supplement
to the Conference Board Economic Record, Vol. II, December 26, 1940. Figures for the compon-
ent industries have not been published and only two are available, metal products and
paper, from 1935 on (see the Conference Board's Economic Almanac for the years 1940—
1944/45, five issues).
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For a still earlier period, from January 1920 through August 1933, an
index of physical volume of new orders (1923—25 =100)was compiled by
the Department of Commerce. Its components fall into six groups:
textiles, iron and steel, lumber, paper and printing, stone and clay, and
transportation equipment.22 But the basis of all these indexes is narrow,
although their names suggest broad industrial coverage. They are built
from commodity data of the same type as other individual industry or
product series in our collection, and actually include several of these series.
The total index reflects mainly new orders for steel, lumber, and textile
products, yet the makers of it believed that it is "quite representative of
orders given in advance of production" because many of the industries
for which no data were available do not in general have advance orders.
The claim can well be doubted, but the index has at any rate no competitor
for the period prior to 1929.23
Chart 14.2 presents the three most comprehensive new order series
in the compilations described above. These series cover durable as well
as nondurable goods, but do not include industries in which new orders
are practically identical with shipments, or are assumed to be. Thus of
the major nondurable goods industries only the four reporting order
backlogs are included in the 1939—58 series of the Commerce Department
(Office of Business Economics). Again in the NICB series (1929—44),
nondurables are represented only by textiles, clothing, leather, shoes,
paper, and chemicals and drugs. Hence the weight of durable goods in
these data is heavy. The course of the corresponding series on new orders
for durables only was, most of the time, closely parallel to the course of
the series plotted on Chart 14.2, but some differences will be noted later
in reference to the timing at individual business revivals and recessions.24
A few features of the chart deserve to be mentioned. The first
Commerce index has no specific cycle turns corresponding to the 1927
trough and the 1929 peak; in fact, the trend in this series was practically
horizontal for more than two years before the onset of the Great Depression.
This is due mainly to the large weight in this index of the lumber com-
ponent: buying and output of lumber have been dominated by relatively
22Thegroup indexes are identified in Table 14.1, note e, except that the one for
transportation equipment is not included: it is simply a weighted composite of our three
series on new orders for railroad cars and locomotives.
"The September 1928 issue of the Survey of Current Business (pp. 19—20) gives a descrip-
tion of this index, including the weights (based on the value added for 1923 and 1925)
of its six major components. Nearly one half of the weight total is accounted for by lumber,
almost 22 per cent by iron and steel products, and 15 per cent by textiles. Using the
durable goods components of this index and the appropriate weighting factors, the
National Bureau has compiled a monthly index of new orders for durable goods, 1920—33.
"The index series for durables—Commerce, 1920—33, and NICB, 1929—30—are
shown below on Chart 14.7. Chart 14.1 presented the OBE estimates of the aggregate
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gentle but persistent downtrends since the end of 1925.25 The timing of the
NICB index at the 1929 peak is uncertain, since its behavior during 1929
is rather different from that of the Commerce index. Both series show the
familiar double-trough configuration in 1932—33, but the Commerce
composite points to the earlier, mid-1932 low as the specific upturn date,
while the NICB series suggests the second low, as it turns up sharply in
March 1933. In the first three years (1939—41) covered by both the
NICB index and the new OBE series, the two behaved in similar fashion,
but after March 1942 the OBE series declined while the NICB index
continued to increase. Only a local high, not a specific cycle peak, can
be distinguished in the value of manufacturers' new orders early in 1945,
at the time aggregate economic activity turned down for a short con-
traction at the end of the war. (Here is the single major difference between
this series and its principal component, new orders for durable goods,
which experienced a specific expansion during the year ending in
February 1945.) The business cycle trough in October 1945, however, was
heralded two months earlier by the nadir in total advance orders of
manufacturers, which principally reflected drastic reductions in new, and
cancellations of old, military contracts.
Table 14.5 shows the timing of the series plotted on Chart 14.2 and
of the corresponding indexes or aggregates for the durable gods industries
at each business cycle turn, 1921—58. It suggests that the conformity to
business cycles may be a little higher for durable goods than for nondur-
able goods orders. The timing of total advance orders, however, is in
most instances identical or closely similar to the timing of new orders
placed with manufacturers of durables. The average leads range from
four to seven months. At both peaks and troughs they are somewhat
shorter for the durable goods than for the combined aggregate. The leads
at peaks are on the average longer than the leads at troughs of the business
cycle but the differences are not very pronounced.26
25 Short and mild interruptions of the downward trend in the index occurred in the
winter 1926—27 and again between October 1927 and the decisive collapse of March 1929
(see Chart 14.2). These movements seem too weak to qualify as specific cycle phases, but
the corresponding index for durable goods orders shows somewhat more of a cyclical rise
in the two years before the 1929 reccsssion. There the movement has been identified as
a "specific expansion," although it too iscertainly marginal (see Chart 14.7 and
Table 14.5).
25 On a state basis, a composite index of new orders has been compiled by the Associ-
ated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM) since 1924. This index is based on reports from a
sample of 160—260 concerns classified by textiles, leather and shoes, metal trades, paper,
and "all other" industries (mostly consumer goods such as optical, confectionery, jewelry,
r'.sbber, plastics, and some electrical appliances). The samples for metal products, paper,
and the heterogeneous "all other" group are considered more representative than the
rest. The total index (1926 =100)has a good record of cyclical conformity during the
interwar period. It led at six of the seven reference turns in the years 1924—38 (coincided
at the June 1929 peak). Its average lead is shorter than the comparable measures in
Table 14.5, about three months at business peaks as well as troughs.
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TABLE 14.5







Durable and Durable and





1. July1921 —6 —6
2. May 1923 —4 —5 July1924 —12 —12
3. Oct.1926 —12 —12 Nov. 1927 —4
4. June 1929 —3 Mar. 1933 —4 —9
5. Mar. 1933 Øa 06
6. May 1937 —5 —5 June 1938 —2 —1
7. Feb. 1945 '3 b Oct.1945 —2 —2
8. Nov. 1948 —5 —5 Oct.1949 —3 —6
9. July 1953 —6 —7 Aug. 1954 —8 —8
10. July 1957 —8 —8 Apr.1958 —2 —2








SOURCE; Measures in lines 1—4 are basedon indexes compiled by the Department oF
Commerce from various individual new order series (see text and n. 23). Measures in
lines 5—6 are based on the National Industrial Conference Board indexes, and those in
lines 7—10 on the current Commerce (Office of Business Economics) estimates of the dollar
values of manufacturers' new orders (see text). The series used in lines 7—10, cols. 2 and
4, was computed by adding the OBE estimates for new orders of all durable goods
industries and four major nondurable goods industries reporting unfilled orders; textiles,
leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
Excluded from the average.
'3The specific cycle peak of March 1942 preceded the February 1945 business cycle
peak by 35 months.
The most comprehensive data on new orders published on a current
basis are the series compiled by the Department of Commerce (Office
of Business Economics). As current value aggregates, they reflect changes
in prices as well as in quantities ordered. They are derived by adding
monthly sales figures to changes in unfilled orders, and are net of can-
cellations.
Table 14.6 shows the timing at each of the six business cycle turns,
1948—58, of eighteen new order series from this compilation. Estimates for
the over-all aggregates as well as for the major component industries are
included. Among the ninety-two recorded observations there are only
seven lags, most of them short, and three coincidences. Two of the lags
occurred in series representing shipments rather than new orders proper—
relating to those nondurable goods industries in which advance orders
444CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
are of little, if any, importance. Also, the few lags were all concentrated
at business revivals—in 1949 and 1958. Leads exceeding six months
accounted for 40 per cent, intermediate leads (four to six months) for
23 per cent, and short leads for 26 per cent of all the observations. Inter-
mediate leads were particularly frequent at the business peaks in 1948 and
1953, short leads at the troughs in 1949 and 1958. The relatively sluggish
timing of new orders on this last occasion deserves special mention, as
part of the remarkable "V-pattern" of the 1958 recovery in which so many
activities turned sharply upward within an unusually short span of time.
Long leads, on the other hand, were prevalent at the two preceding
business reversals, the 1954 trough and the 1957 peak (see the accompany-






months) 5 2 6 11 13 37
Intermediate
(4—6 months) 6 2 5 3 3 2 21
Short (1—3
months) 1 6 3 1 2 11 24
Coincidences 1 1 1 3
Lags 4 3 7
Total 13 14 15 15 18 17 92
That the timing of new orders was on the whole so much earlier in
1954 and 1957 than on the previous occasions calls for explanation,
especially since the capacities of most manufacturing industries increased
considerably in the last decade, causing the average delivery periods to
shorten (some evidence on this is adduced in section IV). Yet the statistical
observations can be rationalized. The upturns in new orders came very
early in the 1953—54 business contraction for most of the durable goods
industries, but the increases in buying were quite sluggish. There was a
gradual downward adjustment of the rates of current manufacturing
operations, which were still considerably higher than those of incoming
orders. Thus the declines in shipments slackened but continued, while
backlogs of unfilled commitments were gradually reduced. In nondur-
ables the leads of new orders relative to shipments were much shorter
than in durables, but here the upturns in shipments, too, occurred before
the general business revival. At the 1957 business recession, production and



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































seven months before the peak in aggregate economic activity, so that
new orders of this group of industries led by particularly long intervals.
In nondurables, shipments also turned down early, together with new
orders, although physical output held steady until several months later.27
Thus here the lead of new orders was partly due to the fact that activity
in most nonmanufacturing industries (whose share in the national economy
has for some time been increasing) continued to advance for several
months after the downturn in current manufacturing operations.
Additional evidence on the behavior of manufacturers' orders since
1949 is provided by series compiled by Standard and Poor's Corporation.
These are monthly indexes (1949 =100)based on dollar values. They are
based on a much smaller sample than the Commerce series; hence they
are considerably more erratic. Yet in those cases where Standard and
Poor's and the Commerce data can be roughly matched in industrial
coverage, there is a substantial correspondence between their relative
movements. As the industries in question are, on the whole, quite highly
concentrated, the correspondence can be explained by the fact that the
indexes are based on reports from a cross section of leading manufacturers,
including most of the largest firms.
Table 14.7 presents the timing record for Standard and Poor's
series and for an index of nonelectrical machinery orders compiled by
the McGraw-Hill Company. Some broad similarities between Tables
14.7 and 14.6 will be noted. The ranking of the revivals and recessions by
average length of order leads is the same in both sets of measures. In
both, the shortest leads are found at the 1958 revival and the longest at
the 1957 recession, while the 1949, 1953, and 1954 episodes have inter-
mediate ranks in the succession from shorter to longer leads (cf. Table
14.6, line 21, and Table 14.7, line 17). There is, of course, no reason to
expect any close similarities between the two tables.28
One major difference between them deserves to be mentioned, how-
ever. The ORE series show cyclical downturns in 1952 and 1953 which
27Theleads (—)orlags (+) (in months) underlying the statements in the text are as
follows:
Peak TroughPeak TroughPeak Trough
Nov. Oct. July Aug. July Apr.
1948 1949 1953 1954 1957 1958
Shipments(value, OBE)
Durable goods industries + 1 0 0 +2 —6 0
Nondurable goods industries —5 +3 not matched —6 —l
Production (FRB)
Durable goods industries —l +1 +1 —l —7 0
Nondurable goods industries —5 —3 —2 —8 +1 —l
SAOnlyin a few cases can the series in the two tables be matched in industrial coverage,
however roughly. There are also a number of other substantial differences between the
two samples, and individual timing observations are as a rule very sensitive to differences
in the data at the critical turning periods.
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TABLE 14.7
Standard and Poor's and McGraw-Hill Indexes of Value of Manufacturers' New
Orders, Timing at Each Business Cycle Turn, 1949—58
Lead (—) orLag (+) atBusiness Cycle (in months)
Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
Oct. July Aug. July April
Industry 1949 1953 1954 1957 1958
1.Steel 0 —9 —6 —2
2.Metal fabricating
(nonferrous) —5 n.m.t —5 —22 —1
3.Machinery, industrial —3 n.m. —8 —9 —1
4.Machine tools —3 n.m. —1 —19 +4
5.Nonelectrical machineryc —1 n.m. —3 —12 —2
6.Electrical equipment —2 n.m.° —1 —15 —1
7.Aircraft n.m. —11 —11 —6
8.Auto parts n.i. n.m.t ..4
9.Lumber n.j. 0 —23 —1
10.Building materials —2 —3 —9 —6 —3
11.Cement 0 n.m.t n.m.t —14 —1
12.Textiles n.j. —3 —11 n.m. n.m.
13.Floor coverings n.i. —9 —7 —6 —3
14.Shoes +2e n.m. —13 0 +1
15.Paper —3 n.m. n.m. —14 —3
16.Composite index" —3 n.m.1 —6 —14 —1
17.Average, 14 component
series, Standard &
Poor's —1.9 —5.4 —6.3 —13.2 —1.5
a Asecondary peak led the July 1957 business downturn by 8 months.
bAminor peak leading the July 1953 business downturn by 4 months can be dis-
tinguished.
Index (1949 =100)compiled by McGraw-Hill Co. Timing measures for this
series are excluded from the averages.
° A minor peak leading the July 1953 business downturn by 2 months can be dis-
tinguished.
oBasedon a tentative trough date.
'A minor peak leading the July 1953 business downturn by 15 months can be dis-
tinguished.
o A minor contraction in this series began 4 months, and ended 5 months, earlier than
the business contraction July 1953—August 1954.
h Standard and Poor's total index of the value of manufacturers' orders. Covers
companies classified into 14 industries (lines 1—4, 6—15) and a few companies in industries
for which no separate indexes are published because of inadequate coverage.
'A minor peak leading the July 1953 business downturn by 6 months can be dis-
tinguished.




Comparison of Department of Commerce and Standard and Poor's
Estimates of Total Advance Orders for Durable and Nondurable Goods,
1949—58
a Includes all durable goods industries and four major nondurable goods industries
reporting unfilled orders.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expar?sions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
anticipatethe business peak of July 1953; most of Standard and Poor's
indexes do not. What this means is that in the OBE series those contractions
that followed the Korean buying surge are clearly separated from the
contractions associated with the 1953 business recession by upward move-
ments which, while mostly mild, are still sufficiently long and distinct
to qualify as specific expansions. In a number of Standard and Poor's
indexes, on the other hand, the corresponding movements are consider-
ably shorter and/or weaker, so that they are merely rises or retardations
superimposed upon the contractions that began early in 1951, not cyclical
expansions. These series, then, do not match the 1953 peak in business,
since they show no cyclical turns between the "Korean" recession in
buying and the 1953 recession in aggregate economic activity. A com-
parison of Standard and Poor's composite index with the Commerce
estimates of manufacturers' total advance orders (Chart 14.3) documents
this point.
Why this should be is not easily determined, the two samples being
as different as they are in size and composition, but one likely reason is
that the OBE series represent new orders net, and Standard and Poor's
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those with heavy military contracts, net orders dropped much more rapidly
than gross orders from their Korean peak levels once the hostilities had
receded and the prospects for truce in the near future had visibly
improved. This was due to increases in cancellations, which did not
continue for long, however. With cancellations back at their more usual,
substantially lower levels, net orders moved upward approaching again
quite closely the values of the gross orders. But the latter may have been
declining all along, or perhaps only leveling ofl in certain lines of business;
only the net and not the gross orders, of course, will reflect a wave in
cancellations directly in the above described way. The series on machine
tool orders illustrate developments of this type in the years 1952—53
(see Chart 14.4) 29
IV. Backlog Cycles and Business Cycles
Cyclical movements in order backlogs conform positively to cycles in
aggregate economic activity as well as to those in activity of the corre-
sponding industries (cf. section II). Downturns in backlogs anticipated
the recent business recessions by long time periods. Upturns in backlogs,
on the other hand, were usually roughly coincident with the business
cycle troughs, often lagging behind the latter by short, and at times by
intermediate, intervals. The summary measures in Table 14.8, lines 25
and 27, provide succinct evidence on total unfilled orders of manu-
facturers and their major component, the backlogs of durable goods.
The timing of unfilled orders at peaks and troughs in the corresponding
series on production or shipments shows the same asymmetrical pattern.
Evidence on these relations will be presented in a more comprehensive
treatment of the subject. They can be simply explained, however.
1. Production can continue to increase for some time after unfilled orders
stop expanding, precisely because it can feed on the abundant reserves
of work inherited from the period of backlog accumulation. 2. Even a
mere stabilization of unfilled orders following a period of decline may put
an end to the contraction in output; an upturn in unfilled orders signaliz-
ing an influx of new business above the current rates of manufacturing
operations will be likely to have an immediate stimulating effect.
However, for the comparisons at business cycle turns (as for those
involving production), the evidence of a strongly asymmetrical peak-
trough timing rests chiefly on the backlog cycles since 1945. At business
recessions of earlier years unfilled orders led by shorter intervals and at
times even lagged. This is suggested in Table 14.8 by the fact that the
SDRapiddecreases in demand for some industrial commodities tend to be accompanied
by cancellation (and rapid increases, on the other hand, by duplication) of orders placed
with manufacturers. Due to cancellations, cyclical declines are as a rule larger in net than



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Grossand Net New Orders for Machine Tools, 1945—58
orders.
SOURCE; National Machine Tool Builders' Association.
averages in column 5 are on the whole much smaller for thepre-Worid
War II series than for the series covering the business recessions of the more
recent period, and a closer inspection of the data substantiates the finding.30
A major point in the explanation of these differences is that backlog
contractions are often much slower and longer when they start from very
high levels than when they start at peaks that are relatively low. Of
course, this is not inevitably so. How long it takes to reduce avolume
When all the individual observations at business cycle peaks underlying the measures
in Table 14.8, col. 5, are divided into two groups, those relating to the recessions before
and those relating to the recessions after 1945, it is found that the former average —0.8 and
the latter —13.2 months. Taking only the four series that extend over both the prewar
and the recent postwar years (lines 7, 9—11), the corresponding averages are —2.2 and
—13.4 months.
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Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Asterisks identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in net orders; dots, in grossCYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
of unfilled orders to a given level depends on the average rate of net
backlog liquidation. If this rate were sufficiently higher in the large
than in the small backlog cycle, the former would have the shorter
contraction (which would then necessarily be much steeper, too). But
this situation, though conceivable, is not very likely and not observable
in the time series at hand. It is in the advanced stages of vigorous business
expansions that unfilled orders become exceedingly high. Buyers then
still attempt to place new orders in large amounts. If the net rates of
backlog decumulation are to be increased, producers must limit accept-
ance of new commitments and/or speed up deliveries. Drastic measures
of either kind may be necessary to obtain the envisaged effect, and many
manufacturers will probably be partly unwilling and partly unable to
take them. Order limitation is known to be practiced in some industries
but it is difficult to detect its effects in the aggregate data. Certain relevant
factors are essentially beyond the manufacturers' control, at least in the
short run: the capacity limits on the firms' current operations (output,
deliveries) and the rates at which customers try to place new orders, as
well as the urgency of their efforts to buy. When all this is considered, it
does not seem astonishing that the net outcome should be gradual
reductions of backlogs from their top levels. But as long as unfilled orders,
while slowly receding, are still voluminous, current manufacturing oper-
ations have a firm basis—indeed here is a factor that can (and at times
demonstrably does) contribute substantially toward maintenance and
prolongation of industrial prosperity. Hence we have the long backlog
leads at peaks of those business cycles to which the large backlog cycles
correspond.
Chart 14.5 illustrates the point. At the time of the 1937 downturn,
industry on the whole was still operating considerably below capacity.
In that case, the peaks in unfilled orders preceded the central month of
business recession (May 1937) by just one month, as shown by the
NICB indexes for both durable and nondurable goods. At these peaks,
backlogs were still rather small, absolutely and relative to shipments,
despite the fact that they had increased substantially during the slow
recovery of the thirties—for the levels from which they had risen were
painfully low.3' The 1937 dowoturns in unfilled orders were abrupt. 'InJanuary 1935 (the first month covered by the unfilled order series), the ratio of
backlogs to shipments was 0.7 for all durable goods. In April 1937 (peak month for both
unfilled orders and shipments), the ratio was 1.3. This is still a low figure compared, say,
to the ratio of more than 3 in March 1941, when backlogs were said to average from three
to eight times monthly shipments of the various durable goods industries (cf. National
Industrial Conference Board, The Conference Board Economic Record, May 1941, p. 223).
The backlog index for durables increased almost four times between January 1935 and
April 1937, from 50 to 190, in terms of indexes with 1935—39 =100,yet the latter figure
is dwarfed when contrasted with the standing of March 1941 (578), not to speak of the






















































































































































































































0CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
in contrast, the huge wartime wave in durable backlogs was gently
rounded off at its peak late in 1942. The level of these backlogs was almost
stable in 1943, with only a very slight downward tilt. Later the decline
accelerated, but it did not become steep until after the business peak in
February 1945, that is twenty-seven months after the specific peak in
durable backlogs (OBE series).
The next wave in durable goods backlogs started promptly in October
1945, the month of the general upturn. The expansion part of it was
moderated and shortened by difficulties connected with industry's
conversion from wartime to peacetime production, a vast process com-
plicated by strong and increasing demand pressures.32 But there, too, the
downturn came by gradual transition and the contraction was slow and
long, just as would be expected of fluctuations of the "heavy-backlog"
type. This contraction ended with the approach of the 1949 business
revival, to be followed by the second backlog cycle of the postwar period,
which in 1952 reached the peak levels of the huge wartime cycle. This
wave started a quarter of a year earlier and ended a quarter later than
the business cycle 1949—54, but its crest came ten months before the 1953
business peak. As was emphasized before, the exceedingly high level of
durable backlogs at the "rounded top" of this specific cycle was certainly
instrumental in keeping a large part of manufacturing output, and
thereby aggregate economic activity, high (which was especially necessary
to offset the weakness that developed early in the nondurables). The
last cycle in durable unfilled orders had a lower peak, which was reached
six months before the mid-1957 business downturn. The backlog con-
traction that followed lasted until October 1958, half a year after the
trough in economic activity at large.
The picture for the unfilled orders in nondurable goods industries
differs greatly from that for durables (Chart 14.5) .Nondurablebacklogs
increased fast in 1940—41, much slower thereafter up to their peak in
August 1943; their wartime expansion was, of course, substantially
smaller percentagewise than that of durable backlogs. In contrast, the first
postwar wave (1945—49) was relatively larger in nondurable backlogs,
'Untillate in 1946 manufacturers of durable goods continued to accept new orders
at rates far in excess of those that they could handle with any regularity and timeliness.
Order taking could not be maintained at these rates to the satisfaction of buyers and
sellers; toward the end of the year, however, as reconversion advanced, the process of
filling orders accelerated and caught up with incoming business. Thus shipments outpaced
new orders, even though the latter were still increasing (cf. Survey ofCurrentBusiness, July
1947, p. 4).
"Nondurables account for a minor proportion (about 5 to 7 per cent) of total order
backlogs of manufacturers. Indeed, had we plotted the over-all totals in Chart 14.5 on
the same scale as the durable backlogs, we would have added an almost precise replica
of the latter series, a curve running parallel to it only somewhat higher. But the relative
movements of unfilled orders for nondurable goods are nevertheless worth attention.
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reflecting the shifts in demand and the difficulties of reconverting
industries in the period of transition to a peacetime economy. But major
divergences in movement between the two series occurred during the two
last backlog cycles in 1951—52 and again in 1955—56 when unfilled orders
declined moderate]y for nondurable goods but kept increasing steadily for
durables. The upturns in nondurable backlogs were also much earlier
than those in durables in both 1953—54 and 1958.
Table 14.9 summarizes the timing of the most comprehensive backlog
series at consecutive business cycle turns in the period 1948—58. For
the OBE aggregates, these measures amplify Table 14.8 by showing
the systematic character of most of its averages. The table shows also a
broad agreement in timing between Standard and Poor's indexes of
manufacturers' unfilled orders and the OBE series.
The lead of unfilled orders for durable goods, while long at each of the
business peaks during 1945—5 7, has progressively diminished. The number
of months during which backlogs in this sector were declining before the
general downturn was twenty-seven, twenty-five, ten, and six at the
business peaks of 1945, 1948, 1953, and 1957, respectively. These figures
also measure almost exactly the length of the intervals by which unfilled
orders preceded the corresponding peaks in durables shipments. They
indicate, therefore, that working off the backlogs was more effective in
helping maintain the expansion of current activity in 1942—45 than in
1952—53, and again more in the latter period than in 1957. Indeed, even
though the current dollar value of durable goods backlogs was about the
same at its 1952 peak as at its wartime peak ten years. earlier, in months
of current shipments the backlogs were far lower. In 1942 unfilled orders
came to exceed twelve months' shipments; in 1952 they just fell short of
eight months. At its most recent peak in 1956, the ratio of unfilled orders
to shipments was only 4.5 (see Chart 14.1). Apparently, the growth in
the capacity of durable goods industries since 1942 has markedly reduced
the average delivery period, thereby shortening the phase during which
manufacturing production can be maintained by drawing upon an order
backlog of any given absolute size.34
Unless the amplitude of the rises in buying increases sufficiently in
successive business expansions, the growing productive efficiency of the
suppliers will make for shorter expansions in the manufacturing sector.
Similarly, unless the same factor is outweighed by a greater severity of
cyclical declines in current buying, it will bring about some reduction in
the length of manufacturing contractions.35 In the recent period no such
For a similar finding on one of the major components of the durable goods industry
(nonelectrical machinery), see Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Capital Goods
Review, No. 35, August 1958.
5Ifit takes less time to work off a backlog of a given size, less time will elapse before
a given volume of buyers' requirements can be satisfied and before the buyers can renew
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trends in the intensity of either expansions or contractions seemed to have
occurred, although the percentage changes in manufacturers' new orders
has varied greatly from one cyclical movement to another. There were
no systematic changes in the duration of movements in months either, but
the expansion and contraction intervals in durable goods shipments did
show some tendency to become shorter relative to the corresponding
phases in new orders.36
V. Cyclical Djffusion of Manufacturers' Orders
Timing analysis reveals that various series of new orders tend to
expand and contract at about the same time and in conformity to the
movements of the economy at large. Yet it is also evident that there is a
considerable dispersion among the corresponding turning points in these
series. In other words, each cluster of peaks or troughs is spread over a
substantial period of time, although as a rule with an identifiable month
or group of months in which the "density" of the turns is greatest. Thus
cyclical movements in new orders become widely diffused throughout
the manufacturing sector of the economy, but it takes time for them to
spread from one commodity, firm, industry, or region to another.
How they spread among individual products and industries, as well
as among the larger divisions of manufacturing, can be summarized by
ordering on an increased scale. It is obvious, however, that the mere fact that customers
were given prompter service on their recent orders need not induce them to re-order
faster too. Purchases of most durables are deferable. Along with other quality improve-
ments, greater productive efficiency of the suppliers may well have a very substantial
positive effect, but this may be offset or outweighed by other factors, e.g. increased
diffidence of buyers during a deepening recession.
The following chronology of cyclical movements in new orders of durable goods
industries illustrates the statements made in the last two sentences of the text:
Expansions Contractions
8/45— 7/49— 9/51— 12/53—2/45— 6/48— 1/51—1/53— 11/56—
6/481/51 1/5311/56 8/457/499/5112/532/58
Percentage change
in new orders+134+123 +9+63—60 —17 —18 —27—26
Duration New
of phase orders 34 18 16 35 6 13 8 11 15
in Ship-




orders 1.0 l.3 0.8 1.80.8 1.4 1.0
Figures for shipments relate to specific expansions and contractions corresponding
to those in new orders, the dates of which are given in the caption.
Unlike new orders, shipments did not undergo a specific contraction in 1951. For
the purpose of the comparison with 10/49—7/53 expansion in shipments, new orders were
treated as expanding from 7/49 to 1/53.
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TABLE 14.9
Timing of Manufacturers' Unfilled Orders at Successive Business
Cycle Turns, Selected Measures, 1948—58
Series
Lead (—)orLag (+)of





















1. All manufacturing industries
2. Durable goods industries
3. Nondurable goods industries
4. Six durable goods irsdustries°






















Standard and Poor's Compilation:
6. Composite indexe
7. Ten durable goods industriest










a Thegroup reporting unfilled orders textiles, leather, paper, and printing
and publishing. Order backlogs of other nondurable goods industries are considered zero
or negligible.
'Thisseries reached a high peak in March 1951 during the Korean War period. The
ensuing contraction which lasted through 1953 was interrupted by a retardation in the
form of a practically horizontal movement from April 1952 to May 1953, but there is no
cyclical downturn in this series that can be matched with the 1953 business peak.
Includes primary metals, fabricated metal products, electrical machinery, nonelec-
trical machinery, total transportation equipment, and other durables.
dOnlytwo of the backlog series in this group show cyclical downturns that match
the 1953 business peak, with following timing measures: leather (—7) and printing and
publishing (+3).The textile industry saw its unfilled orders contracting from March 1951
until December 1953, although there was a marked retardation in this decline for a year
ending shortly before the recession (from April 1952 until April 1953). The order backlogs
of the paper industry expanded after May 1952, but this movement was interrupted
in the vicinity of the business peak by a short cyclical decline (June—October 1953).
eCoverscompanies classified into 13 industries (see notes f and g) and a few companies
in industries for which no separate indexes are puhlished due to inadequate coverage.
All series in this compilation begin in 1949.
Includes hacklog series for steel, metal fabricating (nonferrous), industrial machinery,
machine tools, electrical equipment, aircraft, auto parts, lumber, building materials,
and cement.
a Includes backlog series for textiles, paper, and shoes.
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constructing diffusion indexes from the new order series in our collection.
Various techniques of making such indexes are available.37 Chart 14.6
employs two. It includes an index showing the percentage of series under-
going specific cycle expansions in each month (A), and an index recording
for a group of series the average duration of their runs, or the average
number of months they have been moving in one direction (B). Index
A is based on specific cycles in fourteen selected series on new orders for
individual industries or products, index B on five-month moving averages
of twelve series of the same kind.
Of the two curves in Chart 14.6, A is much smoother than B. The
reason, of course, is that, in the approach based on specific cycles, all
movements contrary in direction to the cyclical phases of the series are
simply ignored. The moving averages used in the other approach will not,
however, smooth out all such movements, but will merely eliminate the
smaller and shorter among them and reduce the others. Hence the short
swings in series B are not only more numerous but also much larger than
the comparable movements in series A, and dating the specific cycles is
a good deal more difficult for the former than for the latter index. Never-
theless, inspection of the chart shows that the two curves are broadly
similar in their major cyclical movements.
Diffusion indexes based on specific cycles of series that reach their
peaks and troughs in the vicinity of downturns and upturns in aggregate
A simple measure of diffusion records only the direction, not the magnitude, of
changes in the component series. It shows in percentage form how many of these series
(each counted as one) expand at any given time. In an historical index (1), the principle
of determining when a series is expanding is simple: a positively conforming series is said
to expand in each month that falls between a specific trough and a specific peak in the
data; it is said to contract in each month situated between a peak and a trough. But
dating the specific cycles often involves considerable uncertainty even when the job is done
retrospectively; to do it on a current basis is more difficult still. The alternative (2) is
to smooth the component series after seasonal adjustment with appropriate moving aver-
ages, so as to reduce their irregular, and bring out their cyclical, components. Month-to-
month increases or decreases in the smoothed series would then be taken to indicate
cyclical expansion or contraction, respectively. But moving averages with very long
periods must not be applied because when centered they are much out of date and because
they may distort the timing of the series at cyclical turns. Short-period moving averages,
on the other hand, may not be adequate to smooth efficiently the more erratic series in-
cluded in the index. Moore's device of the average duration of run (3) is designed to
yield more smoothness in a diffusion measure and yet avoid long-period moving averages.
Suppose the short-period moving average of a series turns up and rises continually for
one, two, ... months;these movements are then counted as runs of + 1, +2,. .. months.
Declines are treated analogously except that they are given negative signs. Rises of six
months or more are all registered as runs of +6, corresponding declines as runs of —6.
Averages of each month's runs are then struck for all series in the given group. The
rationale of the weighting system lies in th strong presumption that the longer the runs,
the more likely they are to reflect the cyclical phase of the series.
Curves A and B in Chart 14.6 represent measures described in this footnote under (1)
and (3); indexes of type (2) will be introduced somewhat later in the text. For more














Percentage Expanding and Average Duration of Run,
Selected Series on New Orders of Individual Industries, 19 19—38
A. Percentage expanding
Percentage expanding is based on specific cycles of 14 series.
Average duration of run is based on 5-month moving averages of 12 series.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
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B. Average duration of run
A. Percentage expanding
B. Average duration of runCYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
economic activity (and not much later) lead at these business revivals
and recessions persistently, although by variable intervals. This fact,
for which there is ample empirical evidence, is due to the turning point
distribution of the kind just mentioned (typical); the "historical" diffusion
indexes bear a definite relation to the distributions of peaks and troughs
in the series covered.38 It is easy to see that a diffusion index built from
series which lead the reference dates by relatively long intervals (e.g.
new orders) should itself show longer leads than an index representing
tardier activities (e.g. production or shipments). The timing at business
revivals and recessions of diffusion indexesfordifferent economic
processes is a subject of great interest for both the relations among these
series and their possible qualities as leading cyclical indicators.
Table 14.10 lists the leads of the percentage expanding index A at
each successive business cycle turn of the period 1920—38 (col. 1). These
leads are long; they range from six to fifteen months and average eleven
months, which is almost twice the mean lead of either the component
series of this index or the corresponding aggregate (cf. cols.1 and 4).
To the extent that it can be determined, the timing of the average duration
of run appears similar to that of the percentage expanding index, as
can be seen by comparing series A and B in Chart
As leading cyclical indicators, many diffusion indexes based on short-
period moving averages suffer from being very choppy. This clearly
applies to indexes computed from data with large short fluctuations,
such as the individual new order series. Cumulation provides an effective
way of suppressing the smaller irregular movements and bringing out the
larger cyclical movements in these diffusion indexes. However, the method
also substantially reduces the leads of the indexes at business cycle turns.40
The diffusion indexes of new orders nevertheless retain a comfortable
lead even after cumulation. Table 14.10 lists in columns 2 and 3 the leads
at successive business turns of a cumulated percentage expanding index of
new orders and of the cumulated average-duration-of-run series based 'Sometime before the culmination of business expansion the percentage of series
reaching peaks begins to exceed the percentage of series reaching troughs, and when this
develops, the proportion of series expanding starts declining. It does not turn up again
until the percentage reaching troughs exceeds that reaching peaks, which happens some
time before the central month of business contraction. This serves to explain the diffusion
lead in general terms. Depending on the duration of the "zones" of peaks and troughs
and the graduation of the transitions between them, indexes of diffusion will show more
or lest Continuous cyclical fluctuations. See Chapter 2, especially the appendix.
'°Leadsof the index B are not listed in Table 14.10 because some of the turning
dates in this series are rendered uncertain by large short-term fluctuations.
The cumulated figures are derived by taking the deviations of percentage expanding
from 50, or the deviations of the average duration of run from 0, and adding each month's
deviation to the sum of the deviations for all preceding months. Hence the peaks in the




Four Series on Diffusion and Volume of New Orders of Durable Goods
Manufacturers, Timing at Each Business Cycle Turn, 1920—38
Reference Turn































































11.Average, 10 ref. turns —11.2 —7.7 —4.8 —5.8
Based on specific cycles in 14 series onnew orders(machine tools, steel sheets,
structural steel, oak flooring, southern pine lumber, architectural terra cotta, 4 items of
railroad equipment, and 4 items of enameled sanitary ware). All series included are
monthly, except rails, RR passenger cars, and locomotives, which are quarterly. 'Includes13 series on new orders (all listed in note a, except rails, RR passenger
cars, and locomotives, plus two items not covered there, viz, fabricated steel plate and
merchant pig iron). All series included are monthly. This index is based on moving
averages of the following periods: architectural terra cotta, steel plate, structural steel,
and RR freight cars—7 montha; bath tubs—4 months; all others (8 items)—5 months.
The moving-average periods were selected according to the scale given in Chapter 20.
C Based on 5-month centered moving averages of 12 monthly series on new orders
(all those referred to in note b except RR freight cars).
dMeasuresin lines 2—8 are based on the index compiled by the Department of
Commerce and the National Bureau of Economic Research from various individual new
order series. Measures in lines 9 and 10 are based on the index of the National Industrial
Conference Board. See Table 14.5 and the accompanying text.
on the index B from Chart 14.6.41 The averages of these leads are still
as long as 7.7 and 4.8 months. But the timing of the cumulated indexes
is quite variable; at some of the turns the reduction of the leads due to
cumulation (as indicated by comparing cols. 2 and 3 with col.1)is
small, at others large.42
41 The percentage expanding index includes 13 series, all of which except one (freight
car orders) are also covered by the average duration series. The percentage expanding is
based or, 4-, 5-, and 7-month moving averages, according to the scale given in Chapter 20,
so that those component series that change their direction of movement more frequently
are here smoothed with moving averages of longer periods.
"Most of the leads of the cumulated average duration arc somewhat shorter than
the leads of the cumulated percentage expanding at the same reference turns. This
difference is to be expected (see Chapter 9).
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The two cumulative series appear as the first two curves in Chart
14.7. Plotted beneath them is the monthly index of new orders for durable
goods, 1920—33, compiled by the Commerce Department and the National
Bureau. This index covers most of the series used in our diffusion measures
and a few other items. Both its larger and smaller movements are very
similar to the swings in the cumulated diffusion indexes, as can be seen
clearly from the six-month moving average of the Commerce-NBER
series. The same is true for the movements in the NICB index of new
orders for durable goods, which is shown in the chart for 1929—38. The
similarity is, of course, not unexpected, since studies of diffusion indexes
proper have, in many cases, established their close correlation with the
rates of change in the corresponding aggregates.43
The bottom curves in Chart 14.7 represent the Federal Reserve Board
production index for durable manufactures; above itisplotted the
cumulated percentage expanding of sixteen component series of this
index, based on month-to-month changes. The chart and the tabulation
below show that the indexes for new orders consistently lead those for
production. The timing relation between the diffusion measures resembles
the timing relation between the aggregates. The figures in the tabulation
Lead (—)orLag Lead (—)orLag
(+) of Cumulated (+) of Cumulated
Turn in CumulatedPercentage Expanding,Turn in CumulatedPercentage Expanding,
Percentage Expanding New Orders for Percentage Expanding New Orders for
Prod, of Durable Selected Durable Prod. of Durable Selected Durable
Goods Goods Goods Goods
Trough,Aug. 1924 —14 Trough,Mar. 1933 —3
Peak, Sept. 1926 —11 Peak, May 1937 —5
Trough,Nov. 1927 —9 Trough,June 1938 —6
Peak, Aug. 1929 —16 Average,1924—38 —9.1
are also quite similar to the leads of the cumulated percentage expanding
index of new orders at the corresponding reference turns (Table 14.10,
col. 2). This is so because the production series turn at roughly the same
time as aggregate economic activity. Other comparisons between the
cyclical timing of diffusion indexes for new orders and production corro-
borate the above findings.44
°'SeeChapters 8, 9, and 18.
A. F. Burns (Chapter 2) and C. H. Moore (Chapter 8) note that turns in a diffusion
index for new orders precede the corresponding turns in a diffusion index for production.
These indexes differ in several respects from those shown in Chart 14.7. They are based
on specific cycles of the interwar period. The sample of production series is not constructed
to avoid duplication, but covers broad indexes as well as individual commodities, altogether
187 series on durables and nondurables including foodstuffs. The new orders sample
includes 56 series on construction contracts and building permits as well as the 14 series
on new orders proper that are covered by our index A. Moore finds that employment and
payrolls also lag behind new orders, while the diffusion indexes for profits and new orders
are roughly coincident.
465CHART 14.7
Cumulated Diffusion Indexes and Aggregative Series,












































a Based on 4-, 5., and 7-month moving averages of 13 selected series; see text.
Based on 5.month moving averages of 12 selected series; see text.
C Solid lines are seasonally adjusted data, broken lines 6-month moving averages of
these data, centered on fourth month.
d Based on month-to-month changes of 16 series.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
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CHART14.8
Diffusion Indexes of New Orders, Four Groups of Series, 1948—59
Office of Business Economics, New Orders for 21 Durable Goods Industries
Percentage enponding
Average duration of run
The main characteristics of the cyclical diffusion of new orders as
revealed by the commodity data for the interwar period reappear in the
behavior of indexes for the post-World War II period, which are con-
structed from aggregate value series. They are also broadly confirmed by
diffusion measures based on business surveys for recent years.
Chart 14.8 presents eight indexes grouped by pairs representing four
different sorts of data. The series plotted in the upper panel of the chart
measure the diffusion of cyclical movements in new orders for twenty-one
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0
Standard and Poor Survey, New Orders for 14 Industries
Percentage expanding a
Average duration of run
3
0
Purchasing Agents Surveys of New Orders
Not. Assoc. of Purchasing Agents
Metal working plants
Dun 8 Brodstreef Survey, New Orders of All Manufacturers
Forecast
Actual
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.PART TWO
durable goods manufacturing industries covered by the Department
of Commerce compilation. The industrial breakdown used in the con-
struction of these indexes is considerably more detailed than that employed
in the published OBE data; unfortunately, not all of the series included
were available for inspection, so that the behavior of the indexes could
not be examined in the light of the behavior of their components. One
of the two series shows the percentage expanding, the other the average
duration of run for this group of data; the latter is considerably smoother
than the former, as it should be, but both have specific cycles that are
clear and as early as would be expected from the timing of the component
industry series.
The indexes shown in the second panel measure the percentage
expanding and the average duration of run for the group of fourteen
industry series on new orders from Standard and Poor's compilation.
Again, we find that the average duration of run index is smoother than
its companion series, but that fairly clear cyclical movements can be
distinguished in both.
Of the two indexes plotted in the third panel of the chart, the longer
one records the results of the monthly business survey of the National
Association of Purchasing Agents insofar as they refer to new orders.
These figures are based on 200—225 member reports which reflect in
general the conditions in the firms with which the respondents are
associated. They show the percentage of survey participants reporting an
increase plus half the percentage reporting no change in new orders
from a month before.45
The shorter series in the third section of Chart 14.8 is an index com-
puted from a monthly survey of purchasing agents conducted since
November 1951 by Purchasing News magazine. This index shows the
diffusion of new orders of metal working plants only. The computation
method is the same as that used for the NAPA index and has the same
implications. The two indexes are remarkably alike, not only in their
timing which is practically synchronous at turns and base-line crossings,
'Themain effect of this treatment is to raise the level of the index without altering
appreciably its cyclical pattern, because the "no change" answers, while usually more
numerous than either the "better" or the "worse" replies, constitute a relatively stable
series. Two other features of this index may be noted. First, the findings of the survey are
available very early, even before the end of the report month. Second, the replies of the
members are not adjusted for seasonal variation, yet for reasons that are not clear there
seems to be very little seasonal in the resulting diffusion index. Cf. An Appraisal of Data and
Research on Businessmen's Expectations About Outlook and Operating Variables, Report of the
Consultant Committee on General Business Expectations, Federal Reserve Board, September 1955,
p. 62; also, see Heinz E. Luedicke, "The Effectiveness of Opinion Surveys," Bulletin of the
National Association of Purchasing Agents, Vol. XXIV, No. 43 (Section Two), December 2,
1953. After the work on this chapter was completed, the NAPA new orders diffusion
index was seasonally adjusted (see Volume II, series D4.3). The unadjusted data are
used here.
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but also in their range of fluctuation. Even their shorter and smaller
movements have a general likeness.46
The two curves at the bottom of Chart 14.8 represent the actual and
the expected diffusion of manufacturers' new orders as reported in the
Dun and Bradstreet Survey of Business Men's Expectations. Here the
sample Consists of individual business concerns ranging in number
from less than 300 early in 1949 to about 700 in 1958. Each quarter,
responsible management officers of the firms surveyed are asked about
their expectations for the quarter roughly six months ahead compared
with the same quarter of the preceding year. They also provide inform-
ation on the actual change in new orders between the current report
quarter and the same quarter a year ago.47 The resulting diffusion figures
are plotted at midpoints of the intervals to which the underlying com-
parisons refer. This method of presentation, which should assure that the
forecast as well as the actual index figure in any given quarter relate to
the same interval, is comparable with the procedure used in the case of
diffusion indexes based on short-period directions of change.
The indexes represented in Chart 14.8 differ markedly in amplitude
and smoothness, as would be expected in view of the diversity of the
underlying samples and methods. Thus it is obviously far more likely
that fourteen or twenty-one series would all expand or contract simul-
taneously than that some 200 or 1,000 respondents would all report or
anticipate changes in the same direction. Accordingly, the OBE and the
Standard and Poor's indexes should and do reach farther toward the
extremes of the diffusion scale than the other indexes presented. Also,
despite the fact that they are constructed from smoothed data, their short
noncyclical movements are larger and more frequent than those in the
NAPA and Purchasing News indexes which are based on month-to-month
directions o1' change. The Dun and Bradstreet series are, of course, the
smoothest of all, as they are not only derived from relatively large numbers
of reports but also equivalent to indexes computed from quarterly data
graduated with four-quarter moving averages.
"We have no basis for judging how much of this parallelism is due to overlapping
information and how much to convergence of opinions. The membership of NAPA's
Business Survey Committee is said to reflect both regional and industrial diversification
(see Luedicke, "Opinion Surveys," p. 2). Some 42 industries are represented, but informa-
tion about the industrial stratification of the sample is not available. The Purchasing News
survey is described in the source as a "representative sampling of 1,000 metal working
plants across the nation."
Five other variables—sales, profits, prices, inventories, and employment—are also
covered by these surveys. Here the samples are larger than for new orders, ranging from
500-odd to about 1,500 firms over the years, as they include wholesale and retail trade
as well as the manufacturing sector. See the Report of Consultant Committee on General
Business Expectations, pp. 25ff. A more comprehensive analysis of these data is given in
Millard Hastay, "The Dun and Bradstreet Surveys of Businessmen's Expectations,"
Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Statistical Association,
September 10—13, 1954.
469PART TWO
In the direction and timing of their major cyclical movements,
however, the diffusion data of Chart 14.8 display a degree of agreement
which under the circumstances can be judged quite substantial. The
intervals between their matching turns are short and their average
timing relative to each other "roughly coincident," with only one marked
exception. Interestingly, in the Dun and Bradstreet survey the expected
diffusion index lags behind the actual one, and it accordingly turns later
than the other series in Chart 14.8, too.48
Of the few timing comparisons at business cycle turns that are avail-
able for these series, all are intermediate or long leads. At the 1953
recession, the leads were nine and eight months for the two OBE indexes,
five months for the two Standard and Poor's indexes, and ten months for
the NAPA, Purchasing News, and the Dun and Bradstreet actual index.
At the 1954 revival, the leads were thirteen and seven months for the
OBE indexes, eleven months for Standard and Poor's, eight months for
NAPA and Purchasing News, and twelve and nine months for Dun and
Bradstreet actual and expected indexes, respectively.
We have also constructed various diffusion indexes from the seven
or eight published component series of the Commerce compilation of
manufacturers' new orders. Although only a few broadly defined industry
figures are published, and these are characterized by frequent directional
changes, the constructs based on the OBE data (smoothed with moving
averages of periods not exceeding six months) have surprisingly clear
cyclical movements. The comparison of our working charts shows that
there is a general but well expressed agreement between the cyclical
movements in the diffusion of the OBE series and the fluctuations of the
indexes included in Chart 14.8. But in view of their choppiness, it is
helpful to present the OBE index figures in cumulative form, and they are
plotted in this fashion at the top of Chart 14.9.
The peaks and troughs in this series led the general recessions and
revivals of the recent period regularly, and so did the turning points of
the other cumulated diffusion index of new orders shown in Chart 14.9,
which is based on the NAPA survey data. The leads of these indexes at
business cycle turns are shown in Table 14.11, columns 3 and 4. They
are shorter on the average and less variable than those of the cumu-
lated diffusion indexes of the interwar years (cf. Table 14.10, cols. 2
and 3).
Two further points can be demonstrated. First, the postwar diffusion
cycles in new orders tended to precede those in production by short
intervals. Table 14.11, columns 1 and 2, presents the evidence based on
'Thetendency for expectations to lag behind actual experience is noted in the
discussion of Dun and Bradstreet surveys in the previously quoted report of the FRB
committee on business expectations (p. 51).
470a Based on 5-month weighted moving averages and on 6-month
averages.
bBasedon month-to-month change.
C 6-month moving average centered.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
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CHART14.9
Cumulated Percentage Expanding and Aggregative Series,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
two pairs of cumulative curves, the OBE-FRB combination and the two
NAPA series (curves 1—2 and 3—4inChart 14.9, respectively).49
Second, Chart 14.9 testifies to the close parallel between cumulated
diffusion indexes for new orders and production and the corresponding
aggregates, just as Chart 14.7 did for comparable series in the interwar
period. The burden of proof here is on the OBE and BRF data (the curves
to be compared are 1—5 and 2—6), since surveys such as that of NAPA,
which are concerned with directions of change, provide no basis for any
meaningful aggregation.
Comparisons analogous to those involving production have also been
made between new orders and the value of shipments or sales. They add
little to what is indicated by our previous findings and may be summed
up very briefly. Timing measures for cumulated diffusion indexes based
on the OBE data (1948—54) show sales lagging behind new orders with a
high degree of consistency by intervals averaging about three months.
In the Dun and Bradstreet survey data, too, actual diffusion of new orders
leads that of sales.5°
VI. Investment Orders and Business Expenditures on Plant and Equipment
Among the earliest insights gained by business cycle students is the
recognition of the exceedingly high cyclical sensitivity of producers'
investment in fixed capital.51 As measured by business plant and equip-
ment expenditures on capital account, this major part of gross private
domestic investment continues to receive considerable attention from
both analysts of economic fluctuations and forecasters of business con-
ditions. This attention is certainly justified and indeed much more of it
will be needed before the interaction of business investment and other
strategic processes during business cycles is properly understood.
Interestingly, as far as the results of the process are concerned, the
cyclical sensitivity of private fixed-capital formation can be seen in large
amplitudes but not in earliness of timing. What little evidence there is on
thispoint indicates that peaks and troughs in aggregate business
expenditures on plant and equipment are roughly coincident with or lag
behind the corresponding turns in general economic activity. In the
period since 1947, for which fairly representative quarterly estimates are
available owing to the joint efforts of the Department of Commerce and
See Chart 14.7 for a demonstration of a similar relationship in 1924—38. The leads
of new orders over production, in terms of indexes of cumulated percentage expanding,
were on the whole considerably longer in those years than in the recent period (compare
Table 14.11 with the tabulation on p. 465 above). °However,the expected diffusion indexes of Dun and Bradstreet fail to exhibit a
similar timing relationship between the two variables. This poses another question about
data derived from these surveys (see reference in footnote 48).
1Fora broad review of the evidence, see Millard Hastay, "The Cyclical Behavior of












Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF TYPES OF LEADING INDICATORS
the Securities and Exchange Commission, business outlays on plant and
equipment were coincident once and lagged at five recessions and revivals
irs aggregate economic activity(see Chart 14.10 and Appendix B).
For the interwar period, quarterly data on plant and equipment ex-
penditures for manufacturing industries alone, constructed by Lowell
Chawner, led at two business cycle turns, were coincident three times, and
lagged on seven occasions (see Appendix B). The lags, however, are
short, as in the postwar period.
Spending by business for fixed-capital formation, then, appears to
fluctuate more or less in unison with, or to lag slightly behind, the nation's
over-all economic performance. Production and shipments of various
investment goods also have roughly coincident timing in most cases,
often with a tendency to lag.52 But, as we know, new orders for these goods
reach their peaks and troughs considerably earlier than production or
shipments and typically before the central months in the general business
recessions and revivals. This situation suggests another possible appli-
cation for new orders data. Can series on new orders be selected which
would, probably in some weighted combination, portray the course over
time of total fixed-investment commitments of the business community?
An index of this sort should predict well at least the major changes in
actual business expenditures on gross investment in productive capacities.
Clearly, the aggregate of new orders received by durable goods manu-
facturers contains orders that correspond to the "equipment" com-
ponent of business fixed-investment outlays, but it also includes a large
variety of other orders. These are the orders placed by intermediate
(nonfinal) users for resale purposes, those placed by government, and
those for consumer durable goods. For the purpose in view, therefore,
new orders received by the following eleven durable goods manufacturing
industries are taken to represent, in large part, commitments for the
purchase of equipment by business enterprise:
Electrical generating and transmission equipment
Other electrical machinery and equipment (excl. radio, TV mfg.)






52 Cf. Table 14.4, lines 1—9, col. 3. Note also the heavy preponderance of coincident
cyclical timing (characteristic expansion stages I—V) in Wesley C. Mitchell, What Happens
during Business Cycles: A Progress Report, New York, NBER, 1951, Table 16, section C, p. 162.
53 The value of an index of this sort was suggested by Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F.
Burns in 1938. See Chapter 6, footnote 13.
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Construction machinery
Office and store machines
Other nonelectrical machinery
Other fabricated metal products
Excluded are the following ten durable goods manufacturing industries:
iron and steel, primary nonferrous metals, other primary metals, radio
and TV equipment, motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, aircraft, stone,
clay and glass, agricultural implements, household appliances. Orders
received by these industries do not, for the most part, represent business
purchases of equipment.
The "plant" component of business capital formation is not directly
represented in the new orders aggregate. The best counterpart to it
among the commitments data isthe series of contracts awarded to
building contractors for industrial and commercial construction, plus
contracts for privately owned public works and public utilities, as com-
piled by the F. W. Dodge Corporation.
Thus the aggregate of current fixed-investment commitments entails
combining the above construction contracts series with the estimates of
new orders for industrial and other productive equipment, made available
by the Department of Commerce. Since the construction contract and the
new orders figures are both in current dollar values, the two can be com-
bined by simple addition.54 In the resulting totals, then, the component
categories are weighted by the transaction volumes they represent.
The estimates of the aggregate value of fixed-investment commit-
ments, derived according to the above procedure are shown in Chart
14.10 together with the NICB data on new capital appropriations and
the OBE-SEC data on total business expenditures on plant and equip-
ment. All series are presented in quarterly, seasonally adjusted form (the
commitment data are, however, available monthly—see series 6.2 in
Volume II). The chart accords with general expectation of what
the relation between commitments and appropriations, on the one hand,
and expenditures, on the other, should be like: the time path of ex-
penditures on investment goods resembles on the whole the course of the
estimated orders and appropriations for such goods, but the cycles in
expenditures lag behind those in orders and appropriations by long
intervals and have smaller relative amplitudes. The only conspicuous
difference between the orders and expenditures curves is that the short
but pronounced "Korean" cycle in investment orders with a high peak
"It would be of interest, also, to obtain a physical volume index, perhaps by combin-
ing floor space of industrial and commercial building contracts with deflated new orders
for producers' durable equipment. Among the advantages of such an index would be the
substantially less erratic behavior of the floor space than the value data, and the earlier
timing of deflated orders at peaks.
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in the first quarter of 1951 is largely smoothed out in the expenditures
for plant and equipment (as itis in the corresponding production or
shipment series).
The regularity of the orders-expenditures lag for investment goods
is brought out in the accompanying tabulation. With the exception of the
long lag following the 1951 peak in orders, which is associated with the
heavy accumulation of order backlogs described above, the lags run
between six and twelve months at every turn.
Peak in Lag of Trough in Lag of
Orders-Contracts Expenditure Orders-Contracts Expenditure
(quarter) (months) (quarter) (months)
II 1949 6
I1951 30 I 1954 12
11957 6 11958 6
As an aid to forecasting plant and equipment expenditures, the orders-
contracts estimates can be shown to possess certain advantages over the
OBE-SEC estimates of the anticipated plant and equipment expenditures.
To this end, Chart 14.11 presents the quarterly percentage changes in
orders-contratts, anticipated percentage changes in expenditures, and
actual percentage changes in expenditures.55 By comparing changes
rather than levels, we avoid a basic difficulty due to systematic revisions
of the expenditures estimates.56
Chart 14.11 shows a systematic lead of the change in investment orders
and contracts over the change in actual plant and equipment expenditures.
Except for one instance of coincident timing, the former series led the
latter at each turning point, by intervals varying from one to four quarters.
This corresponds, of course, to the results in Chart 14.10. The series of
anticipated changes, on the other hand, led both change in actual expendi-
tures and investment orders at only one turn and lagged at two.57
Compared with the investment orders estimates,the OBE-SEC
5Ineach case the percentage change between two successive quarters is based on the
value of the series in the earlier quarter and is plotted in the later quarter. The quarters
are those for which, not those in which, the estimates are made. The series are plotted
separately to the same scale.
A series made up of the anticipated expenditures levels alone cannot be taken to
show at what points of time the actual expenditures were expected to experience upturns
or downturns. Such a series would show changes from a previously anticipated level to the
next anticipated level, whereas, in fact, at any given time the anticipated change is from
the latest available estimate of the actual level to the next anticipated level.
The first anticipation estimates of business plant and equipment outlays, to which
the bottom curve in Chart 14.11 refers, are not available in seasonally adjusted form
before 1953. The earlier unadjusted figures did not seem to warrant presentation; their
record as anticipatory statistics has apparently been poor.
477CHART 14.11
Quarter-to-Quarter Percentage Change in Investment Orders and
Contracts, Actual and Anticipated Plant and Equipment Expenditures,
1948—59
(plotted in the second of the two quarters to which the figures refer)
a Anticipated changes are available (published) approximately 3 months ahead of the
quarter to which they refer.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
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investment expenditure anticipations have the advantage of earlier
reporting dates.58 But the lead of the investment orders relative to the
actual expenditures is so long that it definitely outweighs this advantage.
To illustrate, consider the developments during the latest business revival.
By May 1958, data on new orders and contracts were available for the
first quarter of the year, i.e. through March. Their rates of change showed
a slight improvement (decelerated decline) from the trough in the third
quarter of 1957. This would have provided an indication that the con-
traction in plant and equipment expenditures was leveling off. The
anticipations figures available by that time (through the second quarter
of 1958) gave no such signal: the anticipated decline was larger than in
any preceding quarter. Although a reduction in the rate of decline could
first be detected only a little later, in June, when third quarter anticipations
became available, it was then so embryonic that at best it was a very
uncertain sign of a possible improvement in the fixed investment situa-
tion (note the small rise in the curve at bottom of Chart 14.11 between
the second and the third quarters of 1958). A firmer indication from the
anticipations data could not be had until September 1958, the publication
month of the first estimate for the last quarter of the year. This gave notice
of an upturn in investment in plant and equipment (since the anticipated
change became positive). But an indication to the same effect from the
monthly orders-contracts data was apparent two to three months earlier.
To recognize fully the strength of this evidence, it should be noted
that of the three turning zones covered by these data the 1958 upturn
was decidedly the one to show the performance of the first anticipations
in the most favorable light. At the 1954 upturn the usefulness of the
anticipations was marred by the erratic nature of their early movement
and at the subsequent downturn the record of the anticipations was poor
because they lagged relative to actual expenditures (Chart 14.11).
An attempt to match new orders for and expenditures on plant and
equipment serves the straightforward purpose of tracing the process of
fixed investment through two of its stages that one would expect to be
markedly spaced in time. A very different and much less obvious relation-
ship that can also be explored with the aid of the same two sets of data
is the association between the fixed-investment outlays made and the
orders received by a given group of companies such as any of the major
manufacturing industries. We have made comparisons of this sort for all
58Theestimate of the actualinvestmentexpenditures is published with a four-month
lag (from the last month of the quarter to which the estimate refers). Thus the figure for
the last quarter of 1958 became available in March 1959. But OBE-SEC released a first
estimate of the anticipated plant and equipment outlays for the same quarter (IV 1958)
six months earlier, in September 1958 (that is, with a three-month lead, to the last month
of the quarter). On the other hand, the investment orders series can be constructed with a




Value of New Orders Received and Expenditures on Plant and Equipment
Made by Seven Major Manufacturing Industries: Summary of
Comparisons at Turning Points, 1948—58
No. of Turns
No. of in Plant and Average
Turns Equipment No. of Lead












I.Primary metals 8 6 6 5 —11.0 6.0
2.Electrical machinery 8 5 5 4 —7.2 7.0
3.Machinery except
electrical 8 8 8 7 —6.4 4.1
4.Motor vehicles
and parts 5 7 5 4 —3.0 3.6
5.Other transportation .
equipment 7 5 5 5 —8.4 3.1
6.Paper and allied
products 5 5 5 5 —7.2 2.2
7.Textile mill products 7 6 5 5 —9.0 3.6
8.Total or average" 48 42 39 35 —7.5 4.7
Office of Business Economics. SOURCE: New orders: Department of Commerce,
Expenditures: Securities and Exchange Commission and Office of Business Economics.
aExpressedin months but based on timing comparisons between quarterly turning
points.
b Totals in cols. 1—4; averages, weighted by the numbers of observations for each
component item, in cols. 5 and 6.
industries for which the proper data can be matched. In brief, we find
that as a rule (that is, for a majority of the industries and most of the time)
industry expenditures on plant and equipment followed a course similar
to that of new orders for products of the given industry. Indicative of this
correspondence is the fact that the number of instances in which turns in
new orders can be matched with those in plant and equipment ex-
penditures represents over 80 and 95 per cent of all turning points covered
in the orders and the expenditures series, respectively (this is based on
comparisons for seven industries 1948—58, see Table 14.12, cols.1—3).
Substantial correlations between these series involve fairly long leads,
however. Typically, cyclical movements in the incoming business begin
and end several months ahead of the corresponding movements in the
fixed-investment outlays of the industries concerned (col. 5).
Moreover, there is some indication that these leads are more often
than not longer than the intervals that elapse between the time the
pertinent investment decisions are made and the time they result in
expenditures. The evidence, admittedly slender, comes from comparisons
of the quarterly capital appropriations data compiled by the National
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Industrial Conference Board with the OBE figures on manufacturers' new
orders; such comparisons can be made only for the period 1955—58,
i.e. at peaks and troughs associated with the latest business contraction,
for six major industries. The record for the observations at peaks is four
lags and two leads of new capital appropriations relative to orders received
by the same industry; the record at troughs is three lags of new appropri-
ations, two coincidences, and one lead. The prevailing sequence of
turning points then is:(1) new orders for the industry's products; (2)
newly approved appropriations for the industry's capital spending; and
(3) actual expenditures on the industry's plant and equipment.59 Thus
expansions and contractions in new orders for manufacturers' output
seem to have stimulated and discouraged, respectively, both the new
approvals and the actual implementation of capital expenditure projects
of the affected companies.
This suggests that it may be possible to expand the argument, given
earlier in this paper, that new orders tend to lead the business cycle
"because they lead the output of products to which they give rise and
stimulate ordering of other goods needed for that production." It would
now seem that a substantial cyclical rise in new orders for an industry's
output is also likely to stimulate ordering by the companies concerned
of things that serve their estimated future (as distinct from current)
production requirements. This at least is the tentative conclusion to be
drawn from the record of the generally prosperous decade since 1948.
In this period production pressures on capacity were considerable most
of the time and the sellers' market positions were on the whole strong.
Manufacturers' profits in general reflected these favorable conditions
while moving irs sympathy with the changes in current output. Corre-
spondingly, the short-term expectations of profits were much influenced
by changes in new orders, which anticipate the movements of production
in at least the near future. The business climate in this period was prob-
ably not conducive to the development of any sharp differences between
the short-run and the longer-term economic outlook. It is thus for good
reasons that the recent trends in new orders could be expected, via their
effects upon actual and anticipated profits, to influence in a major way
the industrial producers' decisions regarding investment in plant and
equipment. 60
VII.Summary of Findings
Let us reconstruct what seems to be the typical sequence of events
in the response of an industry to cycles in ordering, and then, against this 'Thelags of (2) relative to (1) appear to be by and large considerably shorter than
the lags of (3) relative to (2).
60Onthe relations between output and investment in plant equipment, see Bert G.
Hickman, "Diffusion, Acceleration, and Business Cycles," The American Economic Retiiew,
September 1959, pp. 535—565.
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background, review our principal findings on the behavior of manu-
facturers' orders during business cycles.
One of the earliest signs of a business revival, at a time when general
economic activity is still depressed, is an upturn in the proportion of com-
panies with increases in new orders. This is followed by an upturn in the
proportion of companies that start expanding their output volumes. As
the expansion in demand widens, aggregate new orders turn up too, again
preceding the revival in aggregate industrial production. At business
recessions, an analogous sequence of downturns in these activities is
typical.
As a rule, the expansion in demand will soon carry new orders above
the levels of production and shipments. Hence unfilled orders accumulate;
they come to increase faster than shipments, and average delivery periods
lengthen. When at a later date new orders turn down, current production
continues expanding. Order backlogs continue increasing, too, although
at a slower pace; they turn down only when new business declines below
the level of shipments. Even after that, output may still move up for quite
a while, but now its ultimate curtailment is foreshadowed. The ensuing
contraction in the industry's activity is, however, slower than the con-
traction in new orders; production and deliveries tend to exceed the
concurrent volumes of new business, as manufacturers work off the back-
logs of their past commitments. Unfilled orders begin to decrease faster
than shipments, and average delivery periods shorten. When current
demand (new orders) turns up again, its level is often much lower than
that of output—too low in the view of most firms to justify a reversal of
their contractive production policies. The initial effects of the increase
in new orders will then be limited to a slowdown in backlog decumulation
and, perhaps, in the rate of output decline. But as soon as the expansion
of new orders carries them above the levels of current manufacturing
operations, the latter will most likely turn up; backlogs by then will be
increasing, too, and we are back at the point in the cycle at which our
description started.6'
Cyclical analysis of series on new orders and related activities gives
results that fit well into the above typical picture. New orders generally
conform closely to business cycles. Few of these series fail to show a
matching peak or trough in the vicinity of a business downturn or upturn.
However, in addition to these reversals, new orders series exhibit a fair
number of "extra"turns. These are typically associated with those
expansions or contractions in new orders that expire before reaching up
or down to the concurrent levels of industrial operations.
Relative amplitudes of cyclical fluctuations are systematically larger
61Aboutthe principal factors introducing deviations from, or complications in, this
sequence, see above pp. 432f.
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for new orders than for the corresponding series on current manufacturing,
partly because output is limited by capacity and partly because of manu-
facturers' efforts to stabilize production.
New orders generally tend to lead production; for goods made to
order, of course, they also lead shipments. Among such goods, those
serving investment in producers' durable equipment and plant are
particularly important and relatively well represented in our data. New
orders and contracts for such capital goods lead investment activity,
whether the latter is measured by output or expenditure. Moreover,
industries experiencing increases in new orders for their own products will
in time also increase their ordering of; and spending on, investment goods.
The tendency of new orders to turn before the reversals in aggregate
economic activity is general and pronounced, hardly less so than their
characteristic of leading production in the industry receiving the orders.
Business revivals as well as recessions are anticipated. Individual leads
vary considerably, but most are long.
Series for durable goods industries have particularly consistent leading
records. Among these, not only goods made to order but also some staples
sold chiefly from stock belong to the early leaders. In the nondurable goods
sector, on the other hand, new orders show a strong leading tendency
only in those industries that report backlogs of unfilled orders; it is at
least doubtful whether there is any similar tendency on the part of those
nondurables for which new orders and shipments are equivalent.
Comprehensive series beginning in 1939 show order backlogs turning
down long before the peaks in business cycles, but turning up at approxi-
mately the time of the troughs. Expansions in backlogs, especially those
of durable goods orders, reached unprecedented heights during World
War II and in the following prosperity periods. From these top levels
backlogs receded only gradually, and this helped to make business
expansions longer. Counteracting this factor, however, is the growth of
manufacturing capacity, which is reflected in lower backlog-shipment
ratios (shorter delivery periods) at successive peaks in aggregate unfilled
orders.
Measures of cyclical timing reviewed in this study show that manu-
facturers' new orders, especially those for durable goods which are
produced largely against advance contracts and often in time-consuming
processes, have considerable merit as indicators of revivals and recessions
in general business. Their records of leading business cycle turns in the
past stand out for consistency in any collection of the available early
indicators. Moreover, the economic significance of the process they
represent is relatively stable; there is no reason why their future behavior
in regard to business cycles should not be essentially similar to their past
behavior.
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The shortcomings of new orders as cyclical indicators are also sub-
stantial, however. Their leads are far from uniform in length and often
rather short. The "extra" cycles in ordering are interesting and on the
whole explicable phenomena, but as a general rule the closer the specific
cycles of an indicator series come to having a one-to-one correspondence
with business cycles, the more useful is the series. More than anything
else, the presence in the new order data of relatively large and frequent
"irregular" movements constitutes a major limitation on the use of these
series for forecasting or identifying business cycle turns.
It is not difficult to conceive of various ways of reducing these defici-
encies. A forecasting index of new orders might be planned to include
series selected for good records of conformity, timing, and smoothness.
It is preferable, however, to base selection not merely on the empirical
records but also on the considerations that explain them. In this study
much attention has been given to such considerations. Once series have
been rated, on the strength of their actual or expected records, those that
are judged better may be given larger weights. Improved performance
of the composite index should then result from the strengthening of the
part played by the more consistent and early leaders among the new
order data.
Beyond other more conventional techniques of index construction,
diffusion measurements are promising. The established empirical rule
that diffusion indexes lead the corresponding aggregates was shown to
apply to new orders. Being based on series that themselves have a strong
tendency to move ahead of the ebb and flow of general business, diffusion
indexes of new orders are therefore especially early indicators of cyclical
revivals and recessions. Various devices, such as cumulation, weighted
graduation, and averaging the duration of movements in the series used
for diffusion measurements, are available to reduce irregularities with a
minimum loss in timeliness.
But any such improvements should be supplemented by efforts to
make the workable data available more promptly. What is needed
primarily is reliable aggregative estimates of new orders divided into a
larger number of industry series than that provided in the present break-
down of government statistics.
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